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Over the past decade, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have revolutionized how the U.S. 
engages elusive militants in low-intensity conflicts by allowing the U.S. to project continuous 
military power without risking combat casualties.  While UAV usage promises additional tactical 
advantages in future conflicts, little agreement exists regarding a strategic vision for UAV 
research and development, necessary for the U.S. to allocate limited resources among UAV 
development programs that address national security objectives.  The present research makes the 
case for a future UAV technology evolutionary path leading to fully autonomous intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)/strike UAV systems for the United States Air Force that 
are capable of sensing their environments through multiple modalities, recognizing patterns, and 
executing appropriate actions in response to their real-time analyses.  The thesis addresses 
enabling technology inroads stemming from major improvements in our understanding of human 
neural circuitry that promise to enable innovations in the artificial intelligence needed to achieve 
autonomous system function.    Arguments are based on projected military and economic benefits 
of autonomous systems and extend the historical model established by the CIA’s successful UAV 
program to unconventional warfare (UW) conflicts that the U.S. Air Force finds itself ill-
equipped to handle.  Counter-arguments are addressed relating to uncontrolled lethal technology, 
conflict initiation thresholds, and the vulnerability of overreliance on high-technology systems.  
In making the case for fully automated UAV technology, research provides a strategic future 
vision for autonomous UAV usage by highlighting the important interaction of artificial 
intelligence, “smart” wide-area sensors, and cooperative micro UAVs.
 
1.0 Introduction: Welcome to the Postheroic Age 
“Wonder weapons... my God, I don't see the wonder in them.  Killing without heroics, nothing is 
glorified... nothing is reaffirmed?  No heroes, no cowards, no troops, no generals?  Only those 
who are left alive and those who are left dead. I'm glad I won't live to see it.” 
-Patton (1970 Film) 
In this 1970 biographical dramatization, General George S. Patton gives this response when asked 
about his opinion of Germany’s advanced technological military pursuits throughout World War 
II.  Patton’s remarks were mostly directed at V-2 rockets, push-button bombing, and atomic 
weapons.  Such weapons represented “wonder weapons” because they could be directly used to 
strike an enemy’s strategic targets, such as population centers, while largely bypassing direct 
ground engagements with the enemy’s armed forces.  Additionally, these weapons’ long range 
and high yield allowed targets to be attacked while significantly reducing friendly forces’ 
exposure to danger.  For example, Germany V-1 rockets killed 5,475 civilians and injured 16,000 
more in a string of attacks on London during World War II.
1
  Such rockets were safely fired from 
mobile launchers in German-occupied territory.  The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
further illustrated this point, forcing the Japanese to surrender and allowing the U.S. to avoid a 
costly invasion of the Japanese mainland that was estimated to result in one million allied 
casualties.  Such weapons firmly entrenched the new era of strategic warfare in the world’s 
collective military capabilities.   
 
Although no one knows if Patton actually uttered the exact quote from the film biography, his 
belief that courageous, disciplined, thoroughly trained soldiers were the key to military victory is 
well documented.
2
  Thus the real General Patton would likely have agreed that the introduction of 
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strategic weapons was undesirable, as these weapons devalued the importance of the disciplined 
fighting soldier, self-sacrifice, and heroism in warfare.  In some forms of strategic operations, a 
soldier’s direct involvement has been largely relegated to planners, initiators, and observers, 
deferring the actual risks and destructive capabilities solely to advanced technologies. 
 
Roughly six decades following the end of World War II, a new class of wonder weapons has been 
silently maturing throughout the last decade of conflict.  Superficially, these new weapons 
resemble updated versions of age-old conventional military vehicles, mostly airplanes and 
helicopters.  Similar to their conventional counterparts, these new weapons can carry out 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, engage enemy forces with 
precision munitions, and transport cargo.  However, these modern wonder weapons differ from 
previous military vehicles in one crucial respect: the new weapons have no human operators 
onboard, as the human controllers wirelessly manage the vehicles from another location, 
sometimes thousands of miles away.  Because pilots and operators are not physically present, 
such planes are frequently referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  For perhaps the first 
time in history, the maturation of UAV technology and its increasing presence in modern conflict 
has subtly but steadily marginalized the importance of humanity’s physical involvement on the 
battlefield itself, thus continuing the trend that began during World War II.  Just as rocketry and 
nuclear weapons relegated humans to support roles in strategic operations, UAVs are now 
removing human soldiers from tactical operations as well.   
 
The potential for completely eliminating physical human presence in tactical engagements is 
particularly significant, as the battlefield has been the historical realm of opposing warriors and 





Sumerian city-states in Mesopotamia as early as 2500-3000 BC.
3
  Violence likely long-preceded 
organized warfare, as is demonstrated by Jericho’s roughly 10,000 year old city wall.
4
  From the 
moment professional armies first organized, military leaders began seeking weapons that 
provided tactical advantages by increasing the average soldier’s lethal battlefield range.  For 
example, roughly five hundred ancient Greek hoplites would be required to effectively cover a 
battle space the size of a football field.
5
  By the American Civil War, military weaponry had 
sufficiently advanced to the point where only twenty soldiers were required to cover this area.  
This number decreased to two soldiers during World War I.  By World War II, one soldier was 
capable of covering an area equal to five football fields.  In 2008, an average of one U.S. soldier 
per 780 football fields existed in Iraq.   
 
The introduction of advanced military vehicles, such as airplanes, has simply compressed the 
window in which some soldiers are exposed to danger.  For example, during the Vietnam War, 
airplane pilots still engaged in some risk when flying missions over the battlefield and could have 
contracted deadly diseases from the unsanitary, tropical habitat in which they resided.
6
  There was 
also a small chance that their planes could crash during a mission.  Thus despite the average 
increasing distance that one soldier could cover, humans have always faced considerable risks 
when going to battle, whether they served in a Roman legion or as a Desert Storm fighter pilot. 
 
Although UAV technology may simply appear to represent yet another installment of military 
weaponry’s increasing battlefield reach, this new technology represents a dramatic departure from 
this paradigm.  Until now, no weapon in history has allowed soldiers to avoid tactical battlefield 
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risks vicariously by controlling weapons from thousands of miles away.  Indeed, in remote split 
operations, a UAV pilot can instantaneously switch between operating a UAV in Iraq and a UAV 
in Afghanistan.
7
  Thus the “wonder” of UAVs is that their use has freed soldiers from 
geography’s limitations.  Consequently, UAV pilots can neutralize targets from remote cockpits 
by day and dine at home with their families by night, even when their planes crash.  The timeless 
battlefield attributes of courage, sacrifice, camaraderie, and perseverance lose some of their 
meaning.  Without these qualities, some critics may argue that even the smallest tactical 
operations will result only in “those who are left alive and those who are left dead.”   
 
Despite the erosion of romantic ideals associated with UAV usage, this technology is already 
deeply entrenched in the U.S. military and intelligence community because it provides military 
leaders with many unique advantages that address current battlefield challenges.  Historically, 
war used to be fought between countries by fielding large armies.  Modern 21
st
 century conflicts 
will become increasingly asymmetric, with large, well-funded forces pitted against smaller 
insurgent forces of dedicated fighters.
8
  Because of their inferior training, numbers, and 
technological proficiency, insurgent forces will be reluctant to directly engage a country’s 
military, thus increasing the appeal of low tech weaponry that reduces insurgent exposure to 
danger.  The frequent insurgent reliance on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack 
Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan represents an example of such tactics.  Indeed, by 2009, 
75% of coalition combat casualties in Afghanistan were being caused by IEDs.
9
  Equipped with 
such an effective tactic, insurgents have recently adopted the psychological strategy of killing 
enough occupiers to eliminate the national will to sustain military presence.  By removing 
soldiers from the battlefield while continuing to project military power, UAVs represent the 
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perfect counter to such a strategy of attrition; if humans are not present on the battlefield, then 
they are not vulnerable to insurgents’ asymmetric tactics.  Because of the technology’s success, 
the U.S. stockpile has grown from few drones (N.B. the terms “UAVs” and “drones” will be used 
interchangeably) at the outset of the Iraq invasion in 2003, to roughly 7000 today.
10, 11
  
Stunningly, the U.S. Air Force trained more UAV pilots than fighter and bomber pilots in 2009.  
Within a decade, the U.S. Air Force anticipates reducing its fleet of manned aircraft while 
quadrupling its arsenal of large, multi-purpose UAVs to 536 drones.
12
  Since 2006, the Central 
Intelligence Agency has also waged a highly successful campaign of UAV strikes against al 
Qaeda and Taliban militants in Pakistan.
13, 14
  UAVs have become internationally popular as well, 
as at least 40 countries have drone research and development programs, and at least 50 countries 
have drones in their arsenals.
15, 16
  As recently as January 2011, the IEEE Spectrum listed drones 
as the 7
th




The outlook for UAV near-term growth is promising, with the Pentagon requesting nearly $5 
billion for UAVs in 2012.
18, 19
  However, long-term funding is more difficult to predict.  For 
example, UAVs are currently being funded through wartime contingency funding instead of the 
defense budget.
20
  Once the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end, UAVs will have to compete with 
other manned system projects for defense budget funding.
21
  Despite this uncertainty, at least one 
current projection states that the 2011 global UAV market is worth roughly $7.1 billion and is 
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expected to reach $10.5 billion by 2021, which represents a roughly 4 percent annual growth 
rate.
22
  Cumulative over that ten year span, the total UAV market will be worth an estimated 
$91.7 billion, with the U.S. expected to account for 69 percent of global UAV purchases.  Such 
growth will occur despite defense cuts and the global economic recession because of the 
technology’s demonstrated value in Iraq and Afghanistan, continued security threats, and the 
promise that UAVs may someday reduce defense costs.  Indeed, given that 9 percent of the 
defense budget is devoted to paying medical coverage and 45 percent is devoted to payroll and 
fringe benefits, UAVs could potentially significantly reduce the Department of Defense’s 
personnel-related operating costs to the extent that they ultimately replace humans on the 
battlefield.
23
   
 
Peter Singer of the Brookings Institute correctly points out that criticizing UAV usage is roughly 
equivalent to arguing against adopting the personal computer in the 1980’s.
24
  In fact, the two 
examples have much in common.  Just like the computers of the 1980’s, current robotic systems 
are large, bulky, and cannot perform many functions.  In both cases, the military is the chief 
research and development financier.  Today, ubiquitous personal computers are so accepted and 
commonplace that they are no longer thought of as simply “computers”.  They are now integrated 
into iPods, cars, cell phones, watches, and GPS systems among many other consumer products.    
The U.S. Air Force’s Unmanned Aerial System Flight Plan indicates that the next generation 
unmanned systems will feature multipurpose robots that have standardized airframes with 
completely modular payloads.
25
  Future UAVs will incorporate a wealth of future technological 
capabilities, such as stealth, solar power, electronic warfare payloads, smaller warheads, sensors, 
                                                          
22
 defenseWeb, 2011 
23
 Erwin, op. cit. 
24
 “Remote Control War”, op. cit. 
25





micro drones, swarming software, hypersonic engines, airborne relay, aerial refueling, and 






  Indeed, Peter Singer noted that UAV 
technologies are “at the Wright Brothers Flier Stage.”
29
  Lt. General Dave Deptula further 
observed that the state of UAVs today is equivalent to the state of manned airplanes in the 
1920’s.
30
  Similar to the success of strategic bombing’s meteoric rise in the 1930’s and 40’s, such 
a metaphor suggests that a UAV technology’s best days lie ahead, as future successes will likely 
involve a UAV-centric strategic vision not currently embraced by military leaders.
31
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1.1 Thesis Statement 
The present research will make the case for a future UAV technology evolutionary path leading 
to fully autonomous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)/strike UAV systems for 
the United States Air Force that are capable of sensing their environments through multiple 
modalities, recognizing patterns, and executing appropriate actions in response to their real-time 
analyses.  The thesis will also address enabling technology inroads stemming from major 
improvements in our understanding of human neural circuitry that promise to enable innovations 
in artificial intelligence needed to achieve autonomous system function.    Arguments will be 
based on projected military and economic benefits of autonomous systems and will extend the 
historical model established by the CIA’s successful UAV program to unconventional warfare 
(UW) and counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns that the U.S. Air Force finds itself ill-equipped 
to handle.  Counter-arguments will be addressed relating to uncontrolled lethal technology, 
conflict initiation thresholds, and the vulnerability of overreliance on high-technology systems.  
In making the case for fully automated UAV technology, research provides a strategic future 
vision for autonomous UAV usage by highlighting the important interaction of artificial 
intelligence, “smart” wide-area sensors, and cooperative micro UAVs. 
 
1.2 UAV History; 1899-2011 
Despite recent headline-grabbing successes of the past decade, unmanned technology’s origins 
can surprisingly be traced back over a hundred years just before the outbreak of the Spanish-
American War.  In 1898, inventor Nikola Tesla presented a small, remotely-operated boat at New 
York City’s Electrical Exposition at Madison Square Garden.
32
  The boat’s steering and lighting 
were both controlled remotely by radio.  Although not an unmanned aerial vehicle, this example 
represents the first known instance of unmanned technology.  Several months later, Tesla 
submitted an article to The Electrical Engineer magazine describing how the same technology 
could be utilized to create remotely-guided aerial torpedoes, but his paper was rejected because 
the idea was perceived as being far-fetched.  Although fanciful for its time, Tesla’s vision for 
UAV technology was insightful and would ultimately become reality 110 years later when 
Hellfire missiles could be guided by laser designators controlled either by forward observers or 
pilots remotely flying UAVs.  As early as 1917, the U.S. Navy attempted to use radio-controlled 
drones to counter German U-boats.
33
  During World War II, the U.S. used controllable drones in a 
limited capacity, and Germany utilized thousands of pulse-jet-powered flying bombs.
34, 35
  By 
1971, the U.S. military had begun developing its first guided cruise missiles.
36
  In 1982, Israel 
used drones against Syria to locate nearly all of its air defense radar systems.
37
  With the 
exception of the past decade, these early attempts at unmanned technology featured drones that 
generally relied upon preprogramming rather than real-time human control  and were not 
reusable, thus limiting their usefulness. 
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In the mid-1990’s, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems developed a UAV called the 
“Predator” to perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions.
38
  During 
the Kosovo conflict, General John P. Jumper, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, observed 
that the U.S. Air Force was having great difficulty effectively acting on targets that had been 
spotted by Predator UAVs.  In what Jumper called “the dialogue of the deaf,” UAV operators 
were frequently unable to provide effective verbal instructions for guiding bomber pilots to 
spotted targets of opportunity.
39
  To correct this problem, Jumper had laser designators installed 
under the nose of each Predator.  These laser designators could be used to highlight targets for 
bomber pilots and guide “smart” ordinance.  Currently, the Predator has logged roughly 950,000 




Because of advances in computers and radio links, 2001 featured a breakthrough year for 
unmanned technology.
41
  For the first time, this technology allowed drones to be controlled from 
afar in real time, thus allowing operators to respond to changing conditions on the ground.  
During that same year, Israel was the first country to arm a UAV, followed closely by the U.S.
42, 
43
  Armed UAVs were viewed as a promising force multiplier that could provide new tactical 
advantages against numerically superior foes.
44
  This concept would be convincingly 
demonstrated by the U.S. later that year.   
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Following the 2001 September 11
th
 attacks, the CIA was granted unprecedented authority to 
engage in offensive, lethal covert actions against militant groups.
45
  The CIA immediately 
inserted a covert paramilitary team into Afghanistan to establish contacts with the Northern 
Alliance, a rival group to the incumbent Taliban and al Qaeda militants, and map the front line’s 
GPS coordinates.
46
  In a reversal from the Kosovo conflict, human CIA operatives and U.S. 
Special Forces used laser designators to mark targets for Predator UAVs armed with Hellfire 
missiles.  In less than two months, the CIA-led war defeated an army of 60,000 soldiers and 
successfully drove the Taliban and al Qaeda from power.  Such rapid success against a 
conventional army at the hands of Special Forces and UAVs changed how modern wars are 
conceptualized and fought, thus highlighting the role of intelligence-driven warfare.
47
  
Specifically, the need to kill enemy leadership and destroy enemy safe havens was recognized.  
The concepts would be expanded upon later in the decade as resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda 
militants staged an insurgency in Afghanistan.        
 
In 2002, technical refinements allowed control of a Predator to be instantly transferred from one 
ground control station to another, thus allowing Predators to maintain 24-hour surveillance by 
staggering the time zones of their operators.  This innovation also allowed mission specialization 
of various operators.  For example, the U.S. Air Force operates its UAVs by using overseas 
personnel to launch and recover aircraft and manages the actual missions by using stateside pilots 
at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada.
48
  On the other hand, the U.S. Army operates its nearly 4000 
UAVs by requiring all UAV operators to work alongside troops overseas, even if their job could 
be handled over satellites from U.S. soil.
49
  Presumably, such a policy maximizes the shared war 
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experience between UAV operators and other Army personnel.  Also unlike the Air Force, the 
Army does not require its UAV operators to be officers or have any previous flying experience.
50
  
This policy is enabled by 2002 advances in specialized radio equipment allowing the use of 
automated landing software, thus eliminating the need for specialized piloting skills.  Indeed, the 
software is reputed to be more reliable than human pilots.  For example, software-controlled 
UAVs can land flawlessly in blinding Iraqi sandstorms.  Regarding the software’s effectiveness, 
Army Sgt. 1
st
 Class Kelly Boehning noted that the U.S. Army’s Gray Eagle UAVs – a newer 
UAV capable of carrying a larger payload than the older Predator UAV model – land “perfectly 
every time, without exception.  It takes some of the fun out, not having the stick and rudder, but it 
also takes the pilot error out: we don’t have any incidents landing – that’s where the Predator’s 
downfall is.”
51
     
 
UAVs began appearing in strictly conventional combat settings around 2002 and 2003.  This time 
period featured a UAV’s first involvement in air-to-air combat when a Predator fired a missile at 
an Iraqi fighter plane.
52
  UAVs also began assuming roles in Operation Southern Watch, which 
monitored the no-fly zones in Iraq’s airspace.
53
  One of their major roles was to bait Iraqi fighters 
and air defense installations, presumably to draw their fire away from manned aircraft and reveal 
their positions for possible strikes.  Ultimately two drones were shot down by surface-to-air 
missiles, and a third was destroyed by an Iraqi fighter plane.  At the beginning of the second Iraq 
war in 2003, aging, first generation Predators were sent into Iraq to locate targets.  If the 
Predators were attacked, the defender was exposed and vulnerable for destruction.  Otherwise, the 
predators could loiter for days conducting reconnaissance.   














The third generation Predator aircraft, known as the Avenger, is better suited to survive in hostile 
airspace, such as Iraq’s in 2003 and Libya’s in 2011.
54
  Unlike its predecessors, the Avenger is a 
pure jet aircraft that first flew in 2009.  It can fly up to speeds of 400 knots and can fly at 50,000 
feet.
55
  The UAV is designed to reduce heat emissions and is shaped in a way that reduces the 
threat of detection.  Lastly, the Avenger can be optionally equipped with a missile warning 
system.
56
   
 
Another recently developed UAV, the RQ-170 Sentinel, has prioritized survivability to an even 
greater extent.  Known as the “Beast of Kandahar” after being first spotted at Kandahar Air Base 
in Afghanistan, the Sentinel employs advanced stealth technology to penetrate sophisticated air 
defense systems.
57
  Experts questioned the need for a stealth aircraft in Afghanistan, considering 
that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda possess any air defenses or radar systems, and many 
speculated that the UAV was being deployed against neighboring countries, such as Iran.
58
  Such 
suspicions were confirmed after it was revealed in 2011 that Osama Bin Laden’s Pakistani 
compound had been monitored by an RQ-170 UAV and when an RQ-170 UAV reportedly crash-
landed in Iran.
59, 60
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By 2004, Taliban and al Qaeda militants had fled Afghanistan and established safe haven in 
Pakistan’s lawless, western tribal regions.
61
  This situation posed a daunting challenge, because 
the military had difficulty identifying highly dispersed al Qaeda militants among the civilian 
population, and their refuge made them virtually immune to overt attack.  Because of its unique 
intelligence-gathering and covert offensive capabilities, the CIA was seen as the agency best-
suited to locate and counter this invisible enemy.  The CIA created a hit list of militant leaders 
they planned to target, including Osama Bin Laden, Al Zawahiri, and Mullah Omar, the Taliban 
leader.  Despite the CIA’s unique skillset, experts still believed that the CIA had been assigned an 
impossible task.  Greg Miller of the Washington Post summed up the difficult intelligence 
environment by explaining that the “enemy is highly adaptive.  They’re moving, in many cases 
every night, and knowing where somebody is today doesn’t help you tomorrow.”
62
  Before 2004, 
the prevailing belief was that the Pakistani tribal area was so impenetrable to outsiders that the 
intelligence would never be good enough to inform a timely covert strike. 
 
 
By 2004, experts had begun to view UAV technology as the perfect tool for penetrating 
Pakistan’s tribal areas and striking targets.  Having been successfully used in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars over the previous three years, drones had acquired a reliable track record as 
both an ISR and a tactical strike platform.  At this time, Predator drones could stalk targets with 
an array of sensors, including optical, heat, and infrared cameras, all while remaining unseen 
from 10 miles high.
63
  Armed with Hellfire missiles, these drones could be sent into Pakistani 
airspace to search for targets, as the lack of an American pilot onboard avoided inflaming 
political sensitivities.  Such an advantage became clear in 2008 after U.S. Special Forces 
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executed an operation in the Pakistani tribal area.
64
  In response to the raid, a high ranking 
Pakistani General issued a rare, pointed denunciation to the U.S. and stated that Pakistan’s 
sovereignty would be protected “at all costs.”
65
  The UAV’s combination of intelligence 
gathering, offensive firepower, and an ability to maintain a low profile represented the perfect 
answer for exploiting the intelligence gap that Greg Miller described, as a drone could identify 
militant leaders and kill them before they had changed hiding places.  Thus, the CIA established 
its drone operation headquarters at Camp Chapman, located in the Khost region of Afghanistan.  
They incorporated their own assets at this location, including CIA operatives and local 
intelligence agents from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
66
  To help identify militant leaders, the CIA 
made a secret agreement with Pakistan that facilitated intelligence sharing and allowed the UAVs 
to operate in the airspace above the tribal regions as long as the U.S. struck militant targets whose 
elimination mutually benefited the U.S. and Pakistan.
67
  The CIA does not publicly acknowledge 
the drone program’s existence because it would embarrass Pakistan by revealing their compliance 
in opening Pakistani air space to U.S. UAVs, but well-respected journalist Peter Bergen recently 




By June 2004, Nek Mohammed had become a high profile target on the CIA’s hit list.
69
  An up-
and-coming terrorist with overt connections to Osama Bin Laden, Mohammed represented the 
intersection of many different terrorist groups, including the Taliban and al Qaeda.  The CIA 
tracked Mohammed to the remote Pakistani tribal regions and learned that Mohammed would be 
hosting a meeting with fellow militants on June 18
th
, 2004.  The meeting’s purpose was to 
reaffirm his devotion to waging Jihad against the U.S.  During the meeting, he placed a satellite 
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phone call to a journalist to announce his position to the world – a call which was intercepted and 
tracked by a roving UAV.  After Mohammed’s identity was confirmed using voice analysis, the 
UAV fired a Hellfire missile at his house and killed Mohammed.  The strike represented one of 




, 2006, the CIA received intelligence indicating that a meeting of high level 
terrorists was occurring in a Pakistani village with an al Qaeda operations chief, a chemical 
weapons expert, and al Qaeda second in command Al Zawahiri all reported to be in attendance.
70
   
A UAV was dispatched, and it successfully destroyed the target location, reportedly killing 
everyone inside.  Two weeks later, the CIA learned that it had struck the wrong house, killing 18 
civilians, including several children.  The mistake caused outrage across Pakistan, inflaming 
strong anti-American sentiment, and is possibly the single biggest event contributing to the 
perception that UAV strikes in Pakistan tend to kill scores of civilians.  The fallout was so great 
that the CIA suspended all drone strikes for 9 months.  However, the drone program was 
ultimately reinstated because drones represented the only possible means for striking targets in 
the Pakistani tribal region.   
 
To improve strike accuracy, the CIA has reportedly paid locals to plant small electronic homing 
beacons by houses sheltering al Qaeda militants.
71
  UAVs can track these beacons and strike the 
correct targets.  This tactic has had a surprisingly effective psychological impact on al Qaeda 
operatives, who occasionally execute people they suspect of planting these devices out of fear and 
mistrust.  UAV targeting also improved in 2009 after a renowned al Qaeda sympathizer, known 
as Balawi, was arrested in Jordan for posting extreme anti-American rants on a blog.  Shortly 









after his arrest, Jordanian and CIA intelligence officials believed that Balawi’s allegiance could 
be changed, thus making Balawi a useful CIA mole due to his credibility within Jihadi circles.  
After reportedly accepting a CIA deal that would make him a millionaire, Balawi was dispatched 
to the Pakistani tribal area to establish contact with high level al Qaeda militants and pass their 
targeting information to the CIA for use in UAV strikes.  His intelligence served as the basis for 
many successful strikes.  Saleh al-Somali, al Qaeda’s external operations chief and Baitullah 
Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, were successfully targeted by a UAV during this 
time period.
72, 73
  The latter strike may have potentially been the catalyst that ultimately compelled 
Balawi to betray his CIA handlers by detonating a suicide vest at Camp Chapman in December, 
2009, killing seven CIA officers.
74
  This double cross resulted in the single-biggest blow against 
the CIA in the War on Terror.
75
  An unprecedented 13 drone strikes occurred during the three 





In the 2010 time frame, the CIA was focused on finding Mullah Baradar, the man who helped 
Taliban leader Mullah Omar flee Afghanistan in 2001.
77
  Baradar was an experienced military 
commander who was directing the insurgent campaign against U.S. forces from the safety of 
Pakistan.  Specifically, Baradar was responsible for the insurgency’s increasing reliance on 
roadside improvised explosives.  By 2010, Baradar had fled the Pakistani tribal areas to avoid 
UAV strikes.  However, on February 10
th
, 2010, the CIA learned through intercepted phone calls 
that Baradar was possibly attending a terror meeting in the densely populated city of Karachi.  At 
the CIA’s request, Pakistani security forces raided the meeting and arrested Baradar.  A similar 
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situation unfolded on September 5
th
, 2011, when al Qaeda external operations leader Younis al 
Mauritania was arrested in the suburbs of Quetta, Pakistan.
78
  Baradar and Mauritania’s arrests in 
Pakistani cities demonstrated that the drone program’s psychological influence on al Qaeda 
leadership forced them to relocate to areas where law enforcement officials have the resources to 
make arrests.
79
   
 
In 2011, UAVs were increasingly involved in successful lethal operations targeting senior al 
Qaeda leaders.  The Pakistani compound concealing al Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden was 
reportedly under surveillance by a drone with sophisticated stealth technology.
80
  Such 
intelligence helped convince President Obama to send a Navy SEAL team to kill bin Laden in 
May 2011.  One month later, Ilyas Kashmiri, one of Pakistan’s most wanted militants, was 
reportedly killed in a June 2011 drone strike.
81
  As recently as September 15
th
, 2011, Abu Hafs al-




Despite errant drone strikes in which many civilians were killed shortly after the drone program’s 
creation, better intelligence has clearly increased the program’s effectiveness over time by 
decreasing accidental civilian deaths and killing al Qaeda leaders at a rapidly increasing rate.  
Only two weeks after Baradar’s capture, the New America Foundation published a policy paper 
stating that 114 drone strikes had been reported in the northwestern Pakistani tribal region since 
2004, resulting in 830 to 1210 deaths.
83
  Of those killed, an estimated 550 to 830 were believed to 
be militants, thus indicating that the true civilian fatality rate since 2004 was roughly 32 percent.  
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Civilian deaths, even if unintentional, are an important factor when analyzing the drone 
program’s effectiveness because they are a politically charged issue in Pakistan.  Pakistani 
citizens are overwhelmingly opposed to the drone program, in large part due to the perception 
that the strikes recklessly kill civilians and violate the nation’s sovereignty.  Indeed, an August 
2009 Gallup poll revealed that only 9 percent of Pakistanis approved of such attacks.
84
   
 
However, the New America Foundation’s report noted that the 2009 average civilian fatality rate 
was only 24 percent, which was significantly lower than the aggregate rate of 32 percent.  When 
examining the data collected through August 28
th
, 2011, the 2010 average civilian fatality rate 
had fallen even further to 5 percent, and the total aggregate civilian fatality rate decreased to 20 
percent.  These sharp reductions in civilian fatalities are a testament to the CIA’s increased 
intelligence-gathering capabilities to avoid mistaken targets, and the precision of UAV 
technology and operations.    
 
As the civilian death rate was declining throughout the decade, the frequency of drone strikes was 
rapidly increasing.  After president Obama was inaugurated in January, 2009, the number of 
drone strikes skyrocketed.  For example, 51 strikes were reported in 2009 alone, which killed as 
many as 10 militant leaders.
85
  By comparison, only 45 strikes occurred during the entire Bush 
administration.
86
  Drone strikes during the Obama administration are also killing al Qaeda leaders 
with increasing frequency.  As of June 2010, drone strikes had killed at least 13 militant leaders 
since Obama took office in January 2009, a rate that far eclipsed the 16 militant leaders that were 
killed during the five years that President Bush authorized drone strikes in Pakistan.  Indeed, this 
















  Overall, four different militants who held the third highest leadership 




The escalation of drone strike frequency in 2008 was initially accompanied by record violence in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009, causing some experts to speculate that the CIA’s drone 
program was ineffective in disrupting terrorist plots.
89
  Bruce Hoffman, a Georgetown University 
expert on terrorism, noted that the drone program’s failure to reduce violence resembled the 
deteriorating security environment in Iraq following Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s death during a 
2006 airstrike, implying that airstrikes were ineffective in dealing with a violent insurgency.  
Extending this principle to the CIA’s drone program, drone strikes against militant foot soldiers 
may not seriously impact the overall number of militants and potentially increases their ability to 
recruit locals enraged by civilian deaths.
90
  However, some experts also speculated that the 
increase of violence in Pakistani cities was a result of militants fleeing from drone strikes in the 
tribal areas, as was demonstrated by the recent high level captures of two al Qaeda leaders 
outlined earlier.
91
   
 
However, these criticisms appear shortsighted when considering the overall impact of drone 
strikes in Pakistan.  Although violence reached record levels in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009, 
it was mainly confined within these countries.  The recent trend of decreasing civilian casualties 
resulting from drone strikes has likely decreased any positive impact that such strikes have had on 
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militant recruiting.  Additionally, al Qaeda militant leaders seeking refuge in Pakistani cities are 
starting to be arrested by local authorities.   
 
Indeed, the recent increase in the number of militant leaders targeted in drone strikes suggests that 
the UAV’s capabilities have been successfully tailored to meet a specific U.S. strategic goal.  In 
contrast to the CIA’s UAV usage, the U.S. military had been ineffectively using UAVs to serve 
purely tactical goals, such as spotting improvised explosives and ambushes, thus providing the 
perception that the U.S. military’s UAVs were not having any useful impact in the War on Terror.  
In a March 2011 report titled, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in 
Afghanistan,” Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, the Army’s top intelligence officer in Afghanistan, 
offered this analysis regarding why the U.S. military’s purely tactical use of drones had not 
effectively improved the long term security environment in Afghanistan: “Aerial drones and other 
collection assets are tasked with scanning the countryside around the clock in the hope of spotting 
insurgents burying bombs or setting up ambushes.  Again, these are fundamentally worthy 
objectives, but relying on them exclusively baits intelligence shops into reacting to enemy tactics 
at the expense of finding ways to strike at the very heart of the insurgency.  These labor-intensive 
efforts, employed in isolation, fail to advance the war strategy and, as a result, expose more 
troops to danger over the long run.”
92
  Flynn’s comments highlighted how overreliance on UAV 
ISR capabilities could actually prolong militant violence by failing to couple the effort to an over-
arching wartime strategy, such as the CIA’s effort to proactively hunt and eliminate al Qaeda’s 
leadership structures.   
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According to Col. John Warden III, targeting an enemy’s leadership structure is the best strategic 
action that maximizes the impairment of enemy capabilities and minimizes the costs associated 
with the action.
93
  Instead of focusing its efforts on the limitless supply of militant fighters, the 
CIA has used its drones to target al Qaeda’s chief facilitators that possessed a unique combination 
of global connections among various militant groups, local support, and access to financial 
resources and technical knowledge.  The reduction in attacks on Western targets during the 2009 
violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan corroborate the importance of these “facilitators” to al 
Qaeda’s mission to attack the West, as the terrorist group has had greater difficulty in directing its 
vast numbers of local fighters in its global terror campaign.  Additionally, the psychological 
impact caused by the drone strikes further exacerbates the militants’ logistical problems.  David 
Rohde, a New York Times reporter who was held for seven months by the Taliban-allied Haqqani 
network, described the drones as “a terrifying presence” in the Pakistani tribal region of South 
Waziristan, causing militant leaders to sleep outside under trees to avoid being struck.
94
  Taliban 
militants also routinely execute locals suspected of passing targeting information to the CIA.  
Several European militants captured in late 2008 “described an atmosphere of fear and distrust 
among members of al Qaeda in Pakistan,” and a Tunisian-Belgian militant emailed his wife 
telling her that he had nearly been killed in a drone strike.
95
   
 
As trusted, well-connected militant leaders are increasingly killed by drones, the resulting culture 
of paranoia threatens to drive various terrorist networks even farther apart, thus compounding al 
Qaeda’s ability to operate globally.  As recently as August, 2011, newly-appointed Defense 
Secretary Leon Panetta noted that “al-Qaida’s defeat was within reach if the U.S. could mount a 
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string of successful attacks on the group’s weakened leadership.”
96
  Because he was Director of 
Central Intelligence during the height of the CIA’s drone program in Pakistan, Panetta’s 
statement indicates that the U.S. recognizes the UAV’s new-found strategic value against al 
Qaeda leadership and will likely continue to use the drones in this capacity for the foreseeable 
future.  In September 2011, the Under Secretary for Defense Intelligence recently said that “[al 
Qaeda’s] senior leaders are being eliminated at a rate far faster than al Qaeda can replace them, 
and the leadership replacements the group is able to field are much less experienced and 
credible.”
97
  He further stated that “[we] have substantially attrited [al Qaeda’s] mid-level 
operatives, trainers, and facilitators, its recent recruits, including westerners, and senior leaders 
and operatives of its safe haven providers,” predicting that the fallout could destroy al Qaeda 
within the next two years.
98
  In 2011 alone, al Qaeda has lost nine of its twenty-most senior 
leaders from 2001, with only one remaining.
99
  Current CIA director David Petraeus observed 
that such catastrophic losses could force al Qaeda members to abandon Pakistan for other safe 
havens.
100
  However, White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan recently reaffirmed the 
U.S.’s commitment to the drone strategy targeting militants, noting that the administration would 
not rule out future unilateral strikes, even in allied territories.
101
  Such a bold statement suggests 
that the U.S. will continue to employ UAV technology to target al Qaeda militants no matter 
where they flee.  
 
In short, because UAVs allow the U.S. to project casualty-free military power into countries in 
which manned elements cannot be easily deployed, UAVs have been instrumental in weakening 
al Qaeda’s organizational capabilities by targeting its key leadership elements taking shelter in 

















Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas’ rugged, remote terrain.  Consequently, the CIA’s 
effective use of UAVs to serve strategic goals is a model ready to be adopted and expanded by 
the U.S. Air Force to increase its relevance in the War on Terror. 
 
1.3 Current and Imminent UAVs Advantages 
Before exploring the advantages and technological inroads associated with autonomous UAVs of 
the future, current tactical and logistical advantages provided by UAVs will be briefly discussed.  
Such advantages are numerous and may presage the replacement of virtually every aircraft in use 
today.  Indeed, one U.S. Air Force engineer noted that “you can envision unmanned systems 
doing just about any mission we do today.”
102
  However, only select UAV advantages will be 
discussed here, while additional advantages provided by future autonomous systems will be 
specifically addressed later.   
 
As previously explained, a UAV’s most visible advantage is that it allows nations to project 
power without risking casualties because these vehicles contain no human operators onboard.  By 
serving as proxies for human soldiers, UAVs allow human operators to prosecute a war effort 
from the safe confines of military bases many thousands of miles away.  This characteristic is 
extremely valuable in combating counterinsurgencies because it prevents militants from 
achieving their main objective: kill enough occupiers that they lose the political will to continue 
the fight.  Additionally, the lack of onboard operators allows UAVs to be used in politically 
sensitive areas in which the deployment of human soldiers would create too much controversy.  
Such is the Pakistan situation described above, where UAVs have been used with great success to 
eliminate Al Qaeda leadership.   
 
UAV technology provides numerous other current and imminent advantages to military and 
intelligence planners.  For example, UAVs can accelerate and maneuver beyond the limits 
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permitted by human biology.
103
  Without such human constraints, UAVs can be designed to 
accomplish missions in manner that was never previously possible using manned aircraft.  For 
example, as recently as August 2011, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
launched an experimental unmanned aircraft that traveled at 20-times the speed of sound.
104
  Such 
a feat was enabled by the development of a scramjet that captures oxygen for combustion directly 
from the air.  Such technology would enable UAVs to use significantly less fuel, thus reducing 
their weight and allowing them to carry more payloads.
105
  Alternatively, reduced weight 
combined with supersonic speed could allow UAVs to be launched into space.
106
  Given the U.S. 
Air Force’s recently launched unmanned X-37B space plane and research on radioisotope-
powered UAV engines for use in oxygen-free areas, the lack of human engineering constraints 
may ultimately allow the development of space-based UAVs that can be deployed anywhere in 
the world with only a few hours’ notice.
107,108
  In fact, the U.S. Air Force’s long term planning 
includes deploying hypersonic UAVs that can arrive anywhere on Earth in under 2-to-3 hours to 
conduct attack and/or ISR missions.
109, 110
  Emerging high value, time-sensitive targets could be 
quickly monitored and neutralized by a hypersonic UAV regardless of geographic location, as 
hypersonic speed and access to outer space would reduce the need for forward air strips outside of 
the continental U.S.  
 
In addition to designs that are not constrained by biological limits, current computerized weapon 
systems simply outperform humans in a number of tactical situations.  Robots can perceive the 
environment and make decisions – albeit in a limited capacity – in ways and at speeds greatly 
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  Differences in processing speed are a product of physical differences: a 
human’s nervous system is relatively slow because it is limited by slower chemical transmission 
within synapses, whereas a robot’s “nervous system” is strictly governed by near speed-of-light 
electronic signal transmission.  Differences in perceptual capabilities exist because robots can 
detect and manipulate stimuli in ways that the human brain is not equipped to handle.  For 
example, robots can use acoustic technology to instantly pinpoint the location of a sniper who has 
just fired.
112
  Such perceptual ability could allow a robot to instantly return fire against well-
hidden targets.  Some military robots can already precisely fire high-energy lasers, hitting targets 
far more accurately than humans.
113
  Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM) systems 
currently protect the Green Zone in Iraq by using radar to automatically detect and neutralize 
incoming ordinance with a Gatling gun.
114
  This system successfully intercepts incoming 
projectiles 70% of the time.
115
   
 
The absence of human operators affords UAVs deployment longevity advantages, as well.  
Advances in solar technology will enable future UAVs to loiter in outer space and power UAV 
flight within the atmosphere for extended periods.  In 2010, Qinetiq’s Zephyr UAV successfully 
remained airborne for 14 days using solar technology, and its developers now believe that the 
technology is capable of sustaining year-round flight within 40 degrees of the equator.
116
  Indeed, 
DARPA is currently interested in developing solar powered UAVs that can stay airborne in one 
region for 5 years at a time.
117
  These UAVs would provide continuous ISR capabilities in areas 
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that are difficult to penetrate in a cost-effective manner.
118
  Such persistence would also allow 
these UAVs to serve as geostationary communication relays that are 1,800 times closer to user 
earth stations than current geosynchronous satellites, thus allowing the earth terminals to be much 
smaller and harder to detect.
119
   
 
Tactical considerations aside, UAVs serving as reliable communication relay hubs allow other 
UAVs to be remotely piloted without the need for expensive satellites, thus significantly reducing 
economic costs associated with any UAV operation.  UAVs regularly consume large amounts of 
bandwidth to send video feed and sensor data to remote operators and intelligence analysts.
120
  
Consequently, competing demands for continuous wideband access are overloading available 
satellite capacity.
121
  After canceling the Transformational Satellite program which would have 
provided additional satellite capacity, the Air Force has increasingly turned to commercial 
providers for additional capacity.
122
  The private sector now provides a staggering 80 percent of 
the U.S. Air Force’s bandwidth needs.
123
  Commercial satellites are not as secure as military 
satellites, thus leaving UAVs vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may render them both helpless and 
useless.
124
  Additionally, commercial satellites sometimes operate at frequencies that are 
incompatible with UAV needs.
125
   
 
Because launching satellites is becoming more expensive and because the Department of Defense 
is expected to see decreasing budgets in the near future, the U.S. Air Force will not likely meet its 





















own bandwidth demands during the next few decades.
126
  Thus, deploying covert UAV satellite 
surrogates will reduce the U.S. Air Force’s reliance on technologically vulnerable commercial 
satellites without the expense of developing and deploying new satellites.  Additionally, reducing 
the military’s “footprint” on commercial satellites has societal benefits, as these satellites would 
likely no longer be considered valid targets in wars fought among technologically advanced 
states. 
 
UAVs whose energy demands cannot be fully met by solar technology can be continuously 
refueled by other UAVs that can perform midair fueling.
127
  For the past 60 years, the U.S. Air 
Force has used manned planes to refuel nuclear-armed bombers so they could be ready to strike at 
a moment’s notice.
128
  Such midair refueling operations requires delicate precision, as a small 
mistake could damage both aircraft involved in the maneuver.  Because of their rapid abilities to 
accurately sense and adjust, autonomous systems excel at such tasks, thus making them ideal for 
this role.  Similar to the advantages afforded by scramjets, aerial refueling allows individual 
UAVs to travel farther and reduces their weight.
129
  Extended operational ranges allow a smaller 
number of UAVs to handle global mission requirements, and reduced weight allows UAVs to 




UAVs are also primed to take over transportation and logistical roles.  For example, UAVs could 
be used to regularly resupply U.S. military bases.
131
  This role would be extremely useful for 
remote outposts, such as those maintained by the U.S. military in eastern Afghanistan, where 

















rough terrain and hostile insurgents greatly hinder resupply missions using freight trucks 
originating in Pakistan.  Such trucks are frequently attacked en route to the outposts, and the 
danger always exists that the local drivers could actually be suicide bombers attempting to 
penetrate the outpost’s perimeter defenses.  By flying supplies into the outposts using UAVs, 
willing drivers need not be found, ground supply vehicles will not be exposed to IED threats, 
suicide bombers would be unable to infiltrate outposts, and Pakistan would have less ability to 
impede resupply missions through its territory, thus giving it less political leverage over the U.S.  
Additionally, no U.S. pilots would be at risk flying routine resupply missions.  Helicopter UAVs 
are seen as an ideal cargo-transporting UAV, which would preclude the need for good weather 
and constructing sophisticated air strips at these rugged outposts.
132, 133 
 
Additionally, transport UAVs could eventually shuttle special operations soldiers to the high 
value targets, such as militant leader enclaves.  Because the success of any militancy strongly 
relies on secrecy, such individuals frequently hide in remote, rugged terrain, or among dense 
urban environments ruled by governments that sympathize with their causes.
134
  To covertly and 
quickly penetrate these areas, special operations soldiers will frequently travel by air in the 
middle of the night.  Transport pilots will often fly without lights to avoid visual detection, and 
they frequently fly at very low altitudes to avoid radar detection.  Such was the situation when 
special operation forces killed Osama bin Laden in May, 2011.
135
  Operating aircraft in such 
challenging situations with reduced sensory input is risky, increasing the attractiveness of 
inserting UAV technology into such missions.  Indeed, relying on infrared and radar technology, 
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UAVs can already autonomously fly and land in harsh conditions, such as Iraqi sandstorms, that 
challenge even the best human pilots.
136
   
 
By 2015, sense-and-avoid technology should allow UAVs to detect other airborne objects and 
avoid them.
137
  At present, technology is available to automatically steer manned aircraft away 
from the ground when an imminent collision is detected.
138
  This system could easily be installed 
on UAVs, thus increasing their safety during low altitude, night time flying.  Additionally, most 
manned aircraft already heavily rely on autopilot capabilities, which resemble the same 
technology used to guide UAV decision-making processes.  UAV technology would essentially 
enhance this autopilot capability by allowing the aircraft to dynamically choose flight trajectories 
that maximize fuel efficiency, thus allowing the UAVs to carry less fuel.
139
  Reducing the UAV’s 
weight by removing human pilots and decreasing fuel capacity may allow each individual craft to 
carry more soldiers and equipment, thus potentially allowing fewer aircraft to be used on risky 
insertion operations.  This issue was very important during the raid that successfully targeted 
Osama bin Laden, as each aircraft was loaded to the platforms’ maximum weight capacities.
140
  
Excess weight is thought to have contributed to a stealth helicopter’s crash during that mission.  
 
The heretofore discussed UAV advantages can be achieved on current non-autonomous UAV 
platforms.   Autonomous UAVs – those that contain some capacity to sense the environment and 
make tactical decisions without human input – provide quantum improvements over the 
significant technology benefits just described.  Before considering these it is important provide 
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balance to the discussion by addressing the potential problems posed by increased reliance on 
UAV technology in warfighting.   
 
  
1.4 Challenges of UAV Usage 
So far, the discussion has been largely affirmative, focusing on the UAV’s history and 
advantages.  Despite their many advantages, UAVs remain somewhat controversial.  Before 
specifically examining future prospects for UAV autonomy, select challenges will first be 
explored to provide a broad context of the other issues associated with their use.  Many of these 
issues will not be resolved by increasing UAV autonomy, and thus any final analysis regarding 
the usefulness of autonomous UAVs must weigh both the advantages and disadvantages.   
 
Although UAVs are perceived to save the lives of the humans that they replace in battle, their use 
may provide conditions that undermine their effectiveness by creating an environment that 
promotes human casualties for the following seven reasons:  
(1) UAV use causes society to become increasingly disconnected from war initiation decisions 
and from ongoing war efforts because it perceives warfare's cost to be significantly smaller than 
in the past.  
(2) UAV use contributes to leadership structures becoming increasingly overconfident with 
regards to technological advantage and, consequently, lower the threshold for conflict initiation. 
(3) The distance of UAV “combatants” from lethal engagements makes it easier for humans to 
kill other humans.  
(4) The state of legal accountability regarding robotic actions is currently unclear, leading to few 





(5) UAV-specific technical vulnerabilities could be exploited to reduce UAV effectiveness or, at 
worst, make UAV employment a liability.  Specifically, if UAVs become ineffective due to these 
vulnerabilities, the U.S. may find itself in a war that it is suddenly not prepared to fight.  
Additionally, malfunctioning UAVs could engender conflicts that the U.S. did not intent to 
initiate.  In rare instances, compromised U.S. UAVs could potentially be used against the U.S. 
(6) Increased UAV usage could increase terrorist recruiting by galvanizing foreign citizens who 
view drone strikes to be a violation of their nation's sovereignty and a cowardly means of 
fighting. These six issues may combine to increase conflict frequency and duration, which could 
potentially lead to more total deaths around the world.  While the use of drone technology has 
undoubtedly provided many advantages, the implications of this technology's usage must be 
carefully explored, as many human lives may be at stake. 
(7) UAV technology proliferation will place civilian populations and infrastructure at risk from 
rogue nations and terrorist organizations.   
 
1.4.1 A Disconnected Public 
Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay Perpetual Peace states that democracies are inherently peaceful 
because the people ultimately have a say in decisions, and their collective decisions are wiser than 
a single dictator's.
141
  Because dictators force others to fight, the threshold for waging war is low 
in a dictatorship.  Conversely, whenever war occurs in a free society, the public chooses to bear 
the brunt of the fighting, pay for the war, repair the destruction, and potentially suffer tremendous 
national debt.  Many capitalistic industries would also suffer if their infrastructure was destroyed 
in a protracted conflict.  Consequently, the public and the business sectors will theoretically only 
support a war if the country is severely threatened and if no other recourse is available.  Because 
the public is closely connected to warfare through potential personal losses of family, friends, and 
wealth, a free society will be intimately involved in participating in all discussions regarding 
war's initiation and cessation. 
 
In recent years, society is becoming increasingly disconnected from discussions regarding the use 
of war to achieve desired objectives because its members perceive war's personal and national 
costs to be significantly smaller than in past wars.  In general, war's human cost has significantly 
decreased over the past two decades when compared to earlier wars in the 20
th
 century.  Figure 1 
displays American casualty figures in each major war over the past 100 years: 
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These data show a general trend of decreasing casualty rates over the past century.  Contrasting 
the two largest extremes of American losses within the past century, an estimated 405,399 
Americans died in World War II, whereas only 2 Americans died in the Kosovo War (not 
shown).
142, 143
  Unlike World War II, Americans and their allies utilized their vast technological 
advantage to safely attack Serbian targets during the Kosovo War.  In fact, the entire 11-week 
campaign was won based exclusively on aerial bombardments.
144
  Additionally, the following 
chart documents the number of U.S. servicemen who served in each of these wars: 
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Figure 1: Historical Casualty Rates for American Soldiers in Recent Wars as a Percent of Total 







These data suggest that the number of U.S. servicemen required to fight in major wars has been 
generally decreasing over the past century, particularly over the past twenty years.  The reliance 
on superior military technology to quickly win wars and distance soldiers from danger 
undoubtedly spared American lives and has generally reduced the number of soldiers required to 
fight in war.
145
  Unfortunately, this recent reality threatens to marginalize public concerns about 
warfare back home.  Previous wars featured friends, family, and neighbors whose service placed 
them in danger, but because few Americans were ever realistically exposed to battlefield dangers 
in the Kosovo War, the public's “stake” in the war was decreased. 
 
Similar to the impact of air power's distancing effect in war, the newest technological revolution 
of military robotic platforms engenders the ultimate disconnect between the public's interest and 
the decision-making process underlying future war discussions.  Robotic systems allow human 
controllers to fight far away from the battlefield, thus reducing their otherwise small risk of 
combat-related death to near zero.  In the Vietnam War, aircraft pilots were exposed to 
considerable risk when flying missions over the battlefield and some contracted deadly diseases 
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from the unsanitary, tropical squalor in which they resided.
146
  Today, pilots located at Creech Air 
Force Base in Nevada can now remotely pilot UAVs to bomb targets located 7,000 miles 
away.
147, 148
    One of the greatest dangers these pilots face during war are traffic accidents while 
commuting to and from work.  Thus, the newest generation of servicemen and women are able to 
fight anywhere in the world while enjoying all the comforts that modern amenities can provide 
after working hours.
149
   
 
While military members should be afforded the opportunity to live in comfort if the situation 
permits, today’s situation threatens to reduce war's negative psychological consequences for the 
soldiers and their families because both groups will be so distanced from war's horrors.  For 
example, soldiers will not be in danger and will not experience the visceral emotions associated 
with physical presence at a battle filled with danger, death, and destruction.  Families will neither 
experience the constant fear of losing a loved-one nor will they experience the sadness of missing 
a loved-one who is fighting in a distant land.  The reduction of war's negative consequences 
ultimately threatens to disengage the public from war decisions, thus greatly reducing the 
likelihood of public veto of elected officials’ war propensities.
150
  The public is less likely to 
oppose a war they perceive to be costless, enabling the government to wage war unchecked, and 
thus potentially increasing the loss of life from involvement in unnecessary warfare.
151
   
 
The public's decreasingly shared participation in war is not a new phenomenon but a continuing 
trend over the past 70 years.  During World War II, the United States instituted conscription, 
                                                          
146
 Harrison, 1989.   
147
 Stone, 2010.  
148
 Factsheets: Creech Airforce Base.   
149
 Stone, op. cit. 
150
 Kahn, 1999. 
151





rationing of petroleum and rubber to civilians, sold war bonds to the public to finance the war, 
and issued a Congressional declaration of war.  Today the United States fields a completely 
voluntary army, the public no longer buys war bonds, the government does not ration food or gas, 
and Congress has not issued a declaration of war since 1941.
152
  This removal of the public's 
shared wartime sacrifices has already decreased the public's motivation to participate in war 
discussions.  The introduction of robotic weapons might sever the final links that maintain the 
public's engagement, as even the soldiers' sacrifices are being diminished.   
 
Economically, the robotic weapons themselves are far cheaper than manned vehicles.  For 
example, one Predator UAV costs a mere $4.5 million, whereas the amount of money needed to 
purchase a single F-22 manned jet could purchase eighty-five Predator UAVs.
153
  Similarly, the 
development of the F-35, the newest manned fighter jet, cost over twenty-two times as much to 
develop as the X-45, a revolutionary air combat UAV with state-of-the-art artificial 
intelligence.
154
   
 
Because these UAVs record live video feeds of all combat situations, their widespread usage may 
provide countless hours of video combat feed to anyone with an internet connection.  These feeds 
risk presenting war as an entertaining, ESPN-like experience where the general public can 
comfortably enjoy watching combat situations at home.  Searching youtube.com with the term 
“UAV footage” yielded 2,030 results, and one of the first videos returned was labeled, “(Funny 
UAV Footage)”.
155
  Additionally these videos likely do not include footage of American deaths, 
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as such videos are frequently banned from U.S.-based home sites.
156
  This biased perspective 
misrepresents war and, combined with decreasing human sacrifices and fewer tax-dollars needed 
to purchase cheaper robotic vehicles, could compel a society to take war less seriously, thus 
leading to increasing reliance on warfare to achieve political gains and, ultimately, to more 
deaths.    
 
Figure 3: Dynamics of UAV Usage and Public Pressure: This figure contains causal loop diagram outlining both 
UAV and public pressure influences on conflict initiation.  B1 represents the pre-existing balancing feedback loop in 
which the public pressures its leaders to avoid conflicts because of mounting friendly casualties.  B2 represents a 
delayed balancing feedback loop in which the public becomes slowly accustomed to a certain amount of friendly 
casualties, thus influencing how much pressure they place on their leaders to avoid conflicts.  R1 represents a 
reinforcing feedback loop in which UAV usage reduces the number of friendly casualties in conflicts, thus causing the 
public to exert less influence on leaders to avoid conflicts. 
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1.4.2 Overconfident Leadership 
In addition to changing public perceptions of war, leadership structures may become increasingly 
overconfident regarding the military advantage they perceive to possess from procuring advanced 
robotic systems.  Admittedly, robotic weaponry does potentially offer unique advantages.  As 
mentioned earlier, robots remove humans from the immediate war zone to the extent that they are 
used.
157
  Additionally, robots have more accurate targeting mechanisms, do not eat food or 
require sleep, do not get bored or distracted, do not panic when facing danger, and are immune to 
biological weapons and some chemical weapons.  An additional example can be found when 
examining the UAV, as drone usage increases the “strike window” in which targets can be 
identified before they're overflown because, unlike manned planes, these robots can hover over 




The exponential growth of technological advances is providing increasingly powerful capabilities 
to military planners.  Unfortunately, this rapid technological expansion may not always be good 
for humanity.  The less-frequently discussed issue is the concomitant shrinking amount of time 
that humans have to adapt to technological changes and understand their implications.  Previous 
generations had years, if not decades, to absorb significant technological changes, whereas the 
present generation must digest even greater numbers of technologies on shorter time-frames.   
 
The combination of accelerated advances in computer processing speed, artificial intelligence, 
and conventional military weapons may quickly lead to robotic weapons capable of unleashing 
destruction on a scale never seen before.  Based on previous growth trends, the military will 
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likely obtain these weapons before they fully understand the consequences of their use.  This lack 
of understanding will also be fueled by both the scientists and industries that pioneered their 
development and manufacture, as these professions often feel compelled to overstate the 
usefulness of technologies to obtain hyper-competitive research funding.  Even worse, their fast 
development could fuel a “use it or lose it” mentality among military and political leaders, as 
such a perceived decisive advantage would be quickly lost to enemy nations if the advantage was 
not pressed immediately.
159
    Combined with the increasing public disinvestment, these factors 
will instill overconfidence in the leadership structure regarding the abilities of their newly-
acquired technologies, which could lead to disastrous miscalculations when deciding whether to 
enter a war and how to execute a war strategy.   
 
Ominously, over the past several centuries, the countries that initially pioneered a revolutionary 
military technology rarely used it the most effectively compared to other opposing countries that 
cheaply caught up by mimicking the technology.
160
  A prime example of such a scenario is the 
development of the tank.  Although France and Britain pioneered this new military technology, 
Germany ultimately used it against them with great effectiveness during the Blitzkrieg.    
 
Robotic technology is also likely to reshape war's nature itself.  Previous policy decisions 
typically held military action as the option of last resort.
161
  Being smitten with the advantages 
afforded by robotic weaponry, elected officials will likely continue selling “shock and awe” 
tactics to the general public, perpetuating the mistaken belief that war can simply be won by a 
large show of technological force, with the Kosovo War and the 2003 Iraq War being recent 
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   Future wars will likely resemble NATO's involvement in the Kosovo war, where a 
concerted effort was made to avoid committing ground forces to the war effort, as the existence 
of robotic platforms will likely raise the ante for human presence in battle.
163
  Similarly, the cost 
of military action may become so low to a “UAV Power” that brief military strikes might become 
a frequent alternative to diplomacy, reminiscent of the cruise missile diplomacy of the 1990s.
164
  
Such short-term military action gives the illusion that an objective has been accomplished, but, in 
most cases little lasting gain is made from such actions and regrettably involves the perpetrating 
country in unnecessary armed conflict.   
 
Occasionally, overconfidence in technology will lead to short-sighted war planning where 
overreliance on UAVs may lengthen armed conflicts despite the fact that their promise of 
casualty reduction could lower conflict thresholds.
165
  Such protracted engagements may increase 
human loss of life, with the 2003 Iraq War and the 2001 Afghanistan War being two recent 
examples.  Overreliance on UAV technology will likely reduce the number of “boots-on-the-
ground” needed to end conflicts by occupying and securing the enemy’s territory.   The existence 
of UAVs may make the public unwilling to sacrifice their loved ones if they perceive that an 
unmanned solution exists for combating enemy forces.  Additionally, since personnel represent 
the largest cost to the U.S. military, manned forces may also be reduced as UAVs are increasingly 
purchased to reduce the Pentagon’s costs.  Without enough soldiers to fully secure a geographic 
area, U.S. forces will be stretched thin, exposing them to danger and increasing the difficulty of 
locating and engaging enemy forces.  Consequently, the U.S. may have difficulty winning the 
conflicts that it so easily initiated. 
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While new robotic technologies will certainly be capable assets, their rapid development and 
deployment will likely outpace a country's ability to fully understand and adapt to the 
consequences of their use.  Despite this lack of complete understanding, a country's leadership 
may feel compelled to use this new-found advantage before other countries catch up.
166
  This rush 
to exploit a fleeting advantage could cause both unnecessary warfare and war mismanagement, 
which in turn will lead to additional deaths from robots' use.
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1.4.3 Polarization of Public Opinion 
Earlier analysis featured UAV successes from the U.S.’s perspective, but the U.S.’s increasing 
reliance on UAVs has also polarized U.S. public and, particularly, international opinion – 
regarding UAV usage.  A recent poll showed strong domestic support for drones, with 9 out of 10 
U.S. veterans and 68 percent of the general U.S. public indicating that they supported UAV 
usage.
167
  According to a report by the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy, 
drone strikes are generally supported by the public in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA).
168
  Based on hundreds of interviews from FATA residents, 52 percent considered 
the air strikes to be accurate, 58 percent felt that the strikes damaged the militants, and 70 percent 
felt that the Pakistani army should also target the militants.
169
  Farhat Taj, a Pakistani academic, 
argued in 2010 that FATA’s Pashtun residents embraced the UAV intervention when she noted 
that, “[the] people of Waziristan are suffering a brutal kind of occupation under the Taliban and al 
Qaeda. It is in this context that they would welcome anyone, Americans, Israelis, Indians or even 
the devil, to rid them of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Therefore, they welcome the drone attacks.”
170
  
Additionally, Taj noted that, “the people feel comfortable with the drones because of their 
precision and targeted strikes. People usually appreciate drone attacks when they compare it with 
the Pakistan Army’s attacks, which always result in collateral damage. Especially the people of 
Waziristan have been terrified by the use of long-range artillery and air strikes of the Pakistan 
Army and Air Force.”
171
  The statement implies that local FATA residents prefer UAV strikes to 
Pakistani military strikes because the operational consequences of UAV strikes are more 
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humanitarian for civilians.  Thus, UAV usage appears to be accepted by both the U.S. public and 
the civilians in the region of conflict who are most directly affected by the strikes. 
 
However, this sentiment is not shared in the other areas of Pakistan.  Less than 10% of Pakistani 
citizens support American UAV drone strikes on Pakistani soil because they view the strikes as 
violating their national sovereignty, even though such strikes target militants that also threaten 
Pakistan's security.
172, 173, 174
  Additionally, 67% of Pakistanis oppose the drone strikes.
175
 Such 
displeasure was highlighted when a song mocking American cowardice because of its reliance on 
UAVs to strike Pakistani targets became popular in Pakistan.
176
  Such a song reflects the 
possibility that instead of being terrified, militants may perceive UAV usage as a sign of 
America's fear of casualties, further emboldening terrorist activities.
177
  Generally speaking, such 
a popular song indicates that foreign nationals do not welcome outside military interference in 
matters that are widely perceived to be internal affairs.  Specifically, the average Pakistani 
worries that drone strikes will inflame militants and cause them to increase the rate of their 
suicide attacks against innocent civilians.
178
  Some evidence exists to support this view.  Violence 
spiked immediately following successful strikes on high profile militants, such as Abu Mus’ab al-
Zarqawi in Iraq and Mek Muhammad and Baitullah Mehsud in Pakistan.
179
  This observation was 
echoed by U.S. Army Major General Flynn when he noted that “…inescapable truth asserts that 
merely killing insurgents usually serves to multiply enemies rather than subtract them.”
180
  The 
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Soviet Union faced similar circumstances when the insurgency became larger as the war dragged 




Due to their widespread unpopularity in Pakistan, extreme outrage typically occurs when UAVs 
accidentally strike civilian targets, although such mistakes are becoming increasingly uncommon 
as intelligence-gathering practices improve.  As was mentioned earlier, the 2004-2010 aggregate 
non-militant fatality rate associated with UAV strikes in Pakistan was 20% and the 2010 rate was 
5%, indicating that targeting intelligence has become more precise.  Regardless, such accidents 
are detrimental to America's war efforts because the United States' enemies will likely harness 
some subset of the resulting negative perception as propaganda to recruit additional fighters.  
Indeed, when UAV strikes accidentally kill women and children, Pashtun customs obligate the 
survivors to seek revenge, thus potentially offsetting the gains acquired from the strike.
182
  
Renowned journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai observed that drone strikes were compelling 
previously unaffiliated people to support the Taliban.
183
  High profile Taliban leaders Baitullah 
Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud have used UAV unpopularity to increase the group’s appeal to 
average Pakistanis and as a means to justify Taliban suicide attacks against a Pakistani 
government that is perceived as being complicit with the drone strikes.
184
  Major General Flynn 
acknowledged this Taliban strategy when he noted that “[at] all times, however, the Taliban 
capitalize on the ensuing mayhem and gain new recruits and re-energize old ones.”
185
  
Admittedly, this dynamic would likely be worse if manned aircraft had been used to strike 
militant targets, as these jets would additionally invoke the ire of the Pakistani government.  
Additionally, manned aircraft would also likely cause more collateral damage due to their 
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inability to perform a pattern-of-life analysis by monitoring a target for hours upon end coupled 
with a smaller window of opportunity to strike the target.    
 
The key question is whether or not UAV usage is creating more militants than they are 
eliminating.  Although no definitive answer can be provided, given Pakistan’s large population 
and thus widespread potential for radicalization, the previous analysis suggests that the answer 
might be “yes.”  Additional enemy recruitment will further increase attack frequency, thus further 
escalating regional violence, thus causing even greater anti-American sentiments.  Growing 
Taliban support throughout Pakistan could provide an environment that better facilitates Taliban 
organization and planning, thus allowing the group to engage in international violence.  
 






Figure 4: Dynamics of Foreign National Alienation and Militant Attrition: This causal loop diagram represents 
Figure 3 with the additions of loops R2 and B3. The R2 loop indicates that militant groups will experience increasing 
recruitment success as collateral damage from combat increases.  Consequently, a burgeoning militant group will 
expand its terrorist activities, further increasing combat frequency.  The B3 loop simply indicates that the number of 
militants will decrease as they are killed in the increasing number of combat engagements.    
 
1.4.4 Technical Vulnerabilities 
In addition to social and political risks surrounding drone usage in war, UAVs themselves have 
inherent technological vulnerabilities that an enemy could exploit to cause significant backlash on 
the user.  Computer systems have long been susceptible to an array of attacks, all of which 
originate from distant, often ambiguous, sources.  For example, software is susceptible to 
disruption via computer viruses that imbed themselves into executable files or from malicious 
worms that can operate completely on their own.  Because UAVs are becoming increasingly 
dependent on computer-based artificial intelligence to carry out normal operational functioning, 
UAVs are becoming increasingly susceptible to these same types of attacks that have disrupted 
computer systems the past few decades.   
 
October 2011 featured the first reported instance of a virus infecting classified computer systems 
used to control UAVs despite the fact that the computer systems were reportedly isolated from 
the internet.
186
  The virus was a keystroke logger, which is a common type of malware that did 
not appear to be specifically designed to disrupt UAV operations.  Prior to this incident, some 
experts were already expressing concerns about UAVs’ technical vulnerabilities.  For example, 
U.S. medical costs are compelling high-tech firms to outsource much of their manufacturing 
capacity to foreign countries, such as China and India, causing America's trade balance in high-
tech goods and services to drop from plus $50 billion in 1996 to minus $50 billion in 2006.
187
  
Because many UAV components are produced in foreign countries, some experts fear that “back 
doors” could be surreptitiously built into American UAVs during the manufacturing process.  
Security experts indicate that China has already demonstrated the capability to engage in this type 
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  Such “back doors” could exist undetected for long periods of time, 
during which the U.S. would become increasingly reliant on UAV usage in warfare.  The foreign 
country could then bypass security measures using the “back door” at a convenient opportunity, 
disrupting UAV computer control systems or even taking over control to direct UAV attacks on 
U.S. forces.  Additionally, such countries could simply stop manufacturing critical UAV 
components for the U.S. if hostilities occurred between the two countries.  Lastly, such 
outsourcing facilitates foreign efforts to clone sensitive military technology and develop their 
own UAVs to use against the U.S.
189
   
 
Examples of militants hacking into UAV systems already exist.  In December 2009, the Wall 
Street Journal reported that Iraqi Shiite militants hacked into Predator UAV communication 
systems using SkyGrabber, an off-the-shelf software produced by a Russian firm.
190
  Specifically, 
these militants intercepted and downloaded surveillance videos captured by the UAV cameras as 
the videos were being broadcast back to ground stations.  Captured videos were later discovered 
on other militant computers in both Iraq and Afghanistan, thus prompting officials to conclude 
that militants around the world had generally acquired the proficiency to hack into UAV feeds.  
No U.S. operations were reported to have been compromised by the breach, but officials 
generally feared that militants could use the stolen videos to determine which locations were 
under surveillance and subsequently avoid them.  In 2010, an Israeli newspaper reported that 
Israeli officials believed that such UAV surveillance feeds had not only been compromised by 
Hezbollah militants in 1997, but that these militants had additionally used the videos to determine 
which routes Israeli troops would take during a subsequent military mission.
191
  The militants 
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used this information to set up an ambush, killing 11 Israeli commandos.  Given that such a 
scenario is known to have backfired in the past and given the fact that the militants were able to 
hack into UAVs using extremely cheap software, it is quite conceivable that experts in well-
funded foreign intelligence agencies could exploit additional vulnerabilities in UAV computer 
systems to great advantage. 
 
Although military officials claimed that this video security vulnerability was being fixed by 
encrypting UAV feeds, the fact that these feeds can be easily intercepted raises serious questions 
regarding the advisability of using remotely piloted UAVs for ISR operations.
192,193
  Indeed, 
retired Navy officer Thomas Rath recently observed that it “takes only a couple of relatively 
simple portable receivers to alert the enemy that [a UAV] is searching for them and to reveal both 
the aircraft’s position and the nature of its scanning system.”
194
  Thus, enemy forces need not 
understand the information contained within the encrypted feeds to take useful action; they can 
simply disperse and lay low until the drone has left the area.  Additionally, enemy forces could 
potentially destroy the drone by firing a heat-seeking surface-to-air missile and hope for a lucky 
strike after detecting a nearby drone’s transmissions.  Theoretically, such a tactic could even be 
employed against stealthy drones, such as the RQ-170, that are difficult to detect with radar.   
 
In addition to attacks from enemy forces, self-inflicted electronic interference represents a serious 
threat to UAVs.  Some experts are advocating that UAVs should be capable of engaging in 
electronic warfare, including jamming of enemy communications.  If these electronic warfare 
systems are not carefully designed, American UAVs may accidentally be a threat to 
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  Such missions would provide unique challenges for a vehicle that is remotely 
piloted from another location.  The fear is that if UAVs jam communication signals, then UAVs 
could jam their own remote piloting signals.
196
  Without proper safeguards, such an interruption 
would cause the UAV to continue jamming, uncontrolled, threatening to isolate the UAV in a 
manner that would be difficult to recover from.  Such a rogue UAV could also potentially wander 
into the airspace of neighboring countries and interrupt their communications, causing 
unnecessary political backlash.   
 
Unfortunately, the fear of rogue, uncontrollable UAVs is not unfounded.  Given the 
transcontinental nature of the communication networks required to remotely pilot UAVs, 
operators frequently lose control of their vehicles.
197
  Two high profile cases already exist of 
UAVs causing serious concerns by going “rogue” and unintentionally wandering into restricted 
airspace.  In 2010, a Fire Scout UAV wandered into restricted Washington D.C. airspace after 
operators lost control, nearly causing fighter jets to be scrambled.
198
  In 2011, a much more 
serious incident occurred when a technologically advanced RQ-170 drone stopped responding to 
operator commands and veered into Iranian airspace before crashing.
199
  In addition to eliciting an 
angry response from Iranian officials who claimed that the U.S. had aggressively violated their 
airspace, the crash likely provided Iranian scientists with access to advanced U.S. stealth and 
imaging technologies.  To prevent UAVs capable of performing electronic attacks from frying 
their own communication uplinks and causing similar incidents, such UAVs should have 
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jamming equipment on their underside, and their communication equipment should be located 
safely on top of the UAV.
200
   
 
The Stock-and-Flow diagram depicted in Figure 5 summarizes the dynamics highlighted so far: 
 
Figure 5: Dynamics of Exploitable UAV Technical Vulnerabilities: This Causal Loop Diagram represents Figure 4 
with the addition of the B4 loop, which indicates that the number of opportunities to exploit UAV technical 
vulnerabilities will increase as UAVs are increasingly deployed, which will ultimately lead to an increase in friendly 
casualties once the U.S. unexpectedly finds itself embroiled in conflicts in which UAVs cannot be used. 
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1.4.5 Legal Ambiguity 
The use of UAVs in warfare could actually lead to more deaths because the state of legal 
accountability with regards to their actions is currently unclear under international law.  The use 
of robotic weaponry in warfare is developing so quickly that international monitoring agencies, 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), cannot keep up with the 
technology's impact on war.  Typically, the ICRC has taken on the responsibility of ensuring that 
the most ghastly weapons are never used on tomorrow's battlefields.  When deciding which 
weapons should be banned, the ICRC has four prescribed guidelines: (1) Nations can only engage 
in types of warfare that do not violate international law; (2) weapons that equally target both the 
military and civilians are banned; (3) weapons that cause unnecessary suffering are banned; (4) 
weapons that the international community finds to be terrible are banned.
201
   
 
The Geneva Conventions mandate that a review be conducted on all new weapons prior to their 
use to ensure that they do not violate any of these guidelines.
202
  While these guidelines have been 
enforced on many types of weapons, they have not yet been applied to the development and 
deployment of robots.
203
  Notwithstanding the steady increase in robots' role in warfare after 
2001, designers of robotic technology for military applications have not typically been instructed 
to consider these human rights issues during the initial design phase that international bodies use 
to judge other weapons of war.  Thus, the technology driving robots' military uses seems to have 
bypassed the standard review process that ensures that weapons minimize civilian casualties and 
do not violate human rights.   
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Perhaps more surprisingly, the ICRC has no official position whatsoever on how robots will 
affect human rights because despite their frequent recent use, the organization still views the 
technology as too futuristic to warrant serious consideration.
204
  This sentiment was echoed by a 
U.S. official who stated that his lawyers indicated that there were no legal prohibitions on 
allowing robots to autonomously choose whether or not to kill a human.
205
  Given these 
circumstances, no official positions on robotic warfare will likely be adopted until a tragedy 
occurs involving their use. 
  
In addition to the uncertainty surrounding their development, serious legal gaps exist regarding 
robots’ actual use in a war zone.  For example, the accountability of robotic controllers' actions is 
entirely unclear.  If a robot is used to commit a war crime or cause an otherwise unintended loss 
of life, it is currently unknown if the chain of command present at the battlefield is responsible for 
the actions or if the chain of command at the robot controller's location is responsible.  It is also 
unclear if robotic controllers are legitimate targets of war.  If they are, then their presence among 
civilian communities and the very families they live with may needlessly endanger civilians.  
This mixing of military and civilian targets risks increased collateral deaths if attacks on robotic 
controllers occur.   
 
Legal questions are complicated by the numerous factors that support, even guarantee, the rapid 
increase in UAV autonomy.  As UAV autonomy increases, human controllers will be too slow to 
react to the fast processing power governing enemy robotic actions, and thus, in order to survive, 
all combatants will be compelled to fully automate their robots to enable rapid electronically 
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controlled counteractions without the human in the loop.  Such reality already exists with Patriot 
Missile Batteries and the earlier-explained automated C-RAM systems that protect the Iraqi 
Green Zone from mortar and rocket fire.  The use of fully autonomous robots in battle raises 
many unanswered questions regarding accountability in war.  For example, as robots become 
more autonomous, the definition of war crime itself may have to be reexamined, as war crimes 
require both a violation and intent.
206
  Because robots have no intentions, they technically can 
never commit a war crime.  Indeed, autonomous robots likely could never fully replicate the 
complexities of human morality, which would make them capable of carrying out actions that 
humans would find too ghastly to commit.   
 
Unfortunately, examples of semi-automated robots mistakenly killing humans already exist.  In 
1988, the computer-controlled Aegis air defense system of the U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly 
identified an Iranian passenger plane as being an Iranian F-14 fighter, which led to the plane's 
destruction when the captain authorized the automated air defenses to engage.
207
  A similar 
mistake occurred again in 2003 when U.S. Patriot Missile batteries accidentally shot down two 
U.S. Warplanes.
208
  If a fully autonomous robot were to commit these types of tragedies, there is 
no policy in place to determine accountability, as it is unclear if the blame rests with the robot's 
manufacturer, artificial intelligence designer, or its user.  The next generation of UAVs currently 
under development feature weapons that will be capable of combat with almost no human 
intervention, and because of the lack of oversight surrounding their development combined with 
the vast uncertainties surrounding their use, UAVs will be poised to administer unchecked death 
and destruction with no legal implications.
209
 
                                                          
206
 Singer, op. cit., pg. 389. 
207
 Gray, 1997. 
208
 Defense Science Board, 2005. 
209






Figure 6 depicts a Causal Loop Diagram summarizes the dynamics outlined so far in the report: 
 
Figure 6:Dynamics of Legal Ambiguity of UAV Usage: This Causal Loop Diagram represents Figure 5 with the 
addition of the R3 loop, which indicates that hostilities will be more easily initiated if no legal accountability governs 
UAV usage. 
 
1.4.6 Increasing Range of Lethal Effectiveness 
In addition to the risk of facilitating more wars which will cause more overall deaths, UAV 
employment in warfare may ironically increase the loss of life in actual conflicts.  Humans 
typically have a natural aversion to killing other humans that must be overcome with proper 
military training.
210
  To counter this aversion, two common practices have been frequently used 
throughout history: (1) dehumanize the enemy, and (2) increase the distance at which killing 
takes place.  The first practice is often accomplished through propaganda tools that paint an 
enemy force as being some kind of savage beast.  For example, one United States World War I 
poster titled “DESTROY THIS MAD BRUTE” portrays a large, dark-skinned ogre-like creature 
wearing a standard-issue German Pickelhaube (spiked-helmet) while holding a distressed, half-
naked, white-skinned woman in one arm.
211
  Presumably, portrayal of the average German soldier 
as a monster and not an ordinary human would make civilians more willing to enlist and engage 
in lethal combat.  Interestingly, as lethal UAVs increasingly populate battlefields, the enemy 
forces will not be entirely comprised of human soldiers, and thus the average human will have 
fewer reservations about engaging an enemy in combat.  The resulting reduction of the violence 
threshold could ultimately lead to more death and destruction. 
 
Historically, armies have relied on the practice of distancing soldiers from the enemy to remove 
the instinctive aversion to killing.  This practice has been well-perfected over the past several 
thousand years, from the use of the bow and arrow to bomber aircraft.  UAVs now place human 
controllers thousands of miles away from the combatants that they are killing.  Similar to 
anonymous gamers or bloggers, the distancing of one's environs from one's actions could lower 
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the threshold at which lethal behaviors are acceptable.
212
  The greater the extent that combat 
becomes simple abstractions on video consoles, the greater the impact that this distancing effect 
can have on human controllers to become completely unaffected by their own acts of killing.  
Indeed, a well-known phenomenon called “doubling” occurs when the separation distance 
changes how a user interacting with a virtual world views himself/herself and becomes capable of 
engaging in very uncharacteristic behaviors.
213
  In conjunction with the emotional distancing, this 
change in behavioral patterns could increase the numbers of soldiers who engage in atrocities that 
they would otherwise not have been involved in had they been on the battleground.  Taken 
together, dramatic behavioral changes caused by psychological distancing combined with the 
removal of risk and visceral battlefield horror threatens to create an atmosphere where war merely 
feels like a video game and killing is both enjoyable and glorified.
214, 215
   
 
The Stock-and-Flow diagram in Figure 7 summarizes the dynamics outlined throughout the 
report: 
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Figure 7: Dynamics of Psychological Doubling: This Causal Loop Diagram represents Figure 6 with the addition of 
the R4 loop, which indicates that the psychological “doubling” associated with combat engagement through a virtual 
medium will increase the ease with which remote UAV pilots will be willing to perform lethal strikes through the 
removal of social and psychological inhibitions. 
 
 
1.4.7 UAV Technological Proliferation Places U.S. Critical Infrastructures at Risk 
Although current small UAVs can provide the U.S. with low-cost, tactical strike capabilities, they 
can also be easily acquired and employed by U.S. adversaries.  Such proliferation is already quite 
evident: as explained earlier, at least 40 countries are developing their own UAVs, with 10 
additional countries maintaining a fleet of purchased UAVs.  Unlike manned aircraft, widespread 
UAV acquisition is facilitated by the fact that UAV production does not require sophisticated 
engineering skills or production facilities.
216
  Small UAVs can be carried and hand-launched by a 
single individual from any location, thus precluding the need for special supporting 
infrastructure.
217
  They can deliver sufficiently destructive ordinance to attack lightly defended 
targets, and they are cheap and easy to assemble with exclusively off-the-shelf components.
218
  
For example, the UAV could be a remote-controlled model airplane wired with explosives and 
flown using video streamed to a laptop.   
 
Examples already exist of groups and individuals creating or obtaining UAVs for a variety of 
purposes: 
 In 2009, Sparkfun Electronics hosted an amateur autonomous vehicle race in which 
participants submitted homemade UAVs that were required to autonomously 
circumnavigate the Sparkfun building.
219
  One UAV successfully completed the course in 
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  Sparkfun held a similar race in 2011, with the stipulation that 
entrants could not spend more than $300 on their vehicles.
221
   
 In 2005 a recent college graduate contacted several private defense contractors to explore 
the possibility of renting a UAV to help peace-keeping forces monitor genocide in 
Darfur.
222
  Although he was interested only in ISR capabilities, this example may 
represent the first instance in which a private individual attempted to interfere in a foreign 
conflict using a UAV. 
 In 2011, a U.S. citizen was arrested for planning to use a $6,500 radio-controlled model 
airplane to strike the Pentagon with 25lbs of C-4 explosives.
223 
 In 2006, the terrorist group Hezbollah penetrated Israel’s sophisticated air defenses with 
potentially Iranian-made UAVs.
224
  Israeli radar could not detect these UAVs because the 
UAVs were small and low-flying.
225
  Two years earlier, a Hezbollah leader noted that 
these UAVs could be used to deliver 40-to-50 kilos of explosives to infrastructure targets, 
specifically citing power plants, water plants, and military bases.
226
   
These examples illustrate that UAVs are easy to obtain from a variety of sources and can be 
loaded with explosives to strike targets.  Most problematic is the fact that both lone-wolf terrorists 
and terrorist groups have obtained and planned to use UAVs against infrastructure targets.  
Additionally, such attacks would be very difficult to detect and thwart.  If a terrorist launched 
such a UAV traveling 30 mph from 3 miles away, the target’s defenders would only have 6 
minutes to respond.  In this scenario, the terrorist would both have a high chance of successfully 
executing the attack and subsequently escaping, thus increasing the appeal of such a tactic. 
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UAVs could be employed against population centers and some critical infrastructures to great 
effect.  Open-air events with large crowds, such as football games, could easily be targeted with a 
terrorist UAV strike.  Although the primary attack would only produce a small number of 
casualties, the secondary panic and stampede could produce many more.
227
  More frightening 
would be UAVs that are capable of dispersing chemical, biological, or radiological agents at such 
events.  Aerial dispersion of easily-obtained pesticides in a crowded area would likely cause great 
panic.  Alternatively, a UAV could contain sticks of dynamite wrapped with nails and cesium-137 
powder, thus creating a flying “dirty bomb” that could be detonated virtually anywhere. UAVs 
could also be used to strike national monuments or passenger airliners as they are taking off or 
landing.  Critical electrical and communication hubs could be struck, causing cascading 
downstream effects that would impede the proper functioning of other critical infrastructures, 
such as chemical processing, banking, water treatment, transportation, and emergency services, 
among others.  An attack at a critical infrastructure or major public event would have long-term 
effects on public psychology and the national economy.   
 
Despite the fact that all of these potential scenarios have already been discussed using other 
delivery mechanisms, the novel advantage of UAV delivery systems is cheap, rapid, easy 
penetration of sophisticated site defenses that were not designed to counter UAVs without 
exposing the attacker to capture.  Given these advantages and given the mounting terrorist interest 
in UAVs for terrorist attacks, future vulnerability assessments and planning need to anticipate this 
tactic.      
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2.0 Don’t Blink: The Exponential Growth of Science and Technology 
“The Difference between science fiction and science is timing.” 
- Colonel Christopher Carlile, the former director of the U.S. Army’s Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence
228
 
When looking throughout the course of history, timing has frequently been the critical element 
that distinguished a useful innovative idea from a laughable one.  Virtually every technological 
advance would likely have been perceived as being unfeasible sometime prior to its eventual 
adoption for many reasons.  For example, some advances simply do not seem possible against the 
backdrop of the current technological progress.  The failure of the medieval age’s greatest minds 
to conceptualize the modern laptop computer is but one of countless examples.  Alternatively, 
technological advances may fail to develop because the advance fails to address a society’s 
pressing need.  In the first century A.D., Hero of Alexandria is believed to have invented the 
world’s first steam turbine, known as the aeolipile.
229
  However, the aeolipile was never adapted 
for practical use, in part because the widespread use of slavery throughout ancient Rome 
precluded any societal desire to find technological solutions for accomplishing work.  Thus, an 
invention will be successfully adopted when it is technologically feasible and satisfies a societal 
need, both of which influence a technology’s proper “timing.” 
 
 Famous inventor Ray Kurzweil has made a science out of projecting technological trends after he 
noticed about thirty years ago that most technological advances and predictions usually fail 
because the proper timing is incorrectly perceived.
230
  Kurzweil founded a business that centers 
on predicting future successful technological advances by properly accounting for the broader 
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contextual timing that would best-support the new technology.  Instead of focusing on forecasting 
an array of very specific, minute advances, Kurzweil recognizes that the holistic parameters 
governing general technological change (i.e. “timing”) are very predictable.  Such a distinction is 
illustrated by the thermodynamics of making popcorn.  While it is virtually impossible to predict 
when individual kernels will pop, one can easily predict when almost all of the kernels will have 
popped.   Notable examples of successful forecasts include his early 1980s prediction that an 
obscure project called the ARPANET would blossom into the modern Internet.  In 2002, 
Kurzweil’s research group used technological data trends to predict that a pocket-sized reading 
device would be technologically feasible, even though the technology did not currently exist.  The 
group ensured that its project would be ready by 2006 when the requisite technology had 
sufficiently matured to support their idea.  Perhaps most relevant to this study, Kurzweil has 
described the use of military UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan as “only an early harbinger” of a 
larger trend, noting that an upcoming age of robotics and artificial intelligence will “create 
qualitative change and social, political, and technological change, changing what human life is 
like and how we value it.”
231
  In 2002, Kurzweil shared with the U.S. Army his belief that 
robotics and artificial intelligence would become increasingly prevalent in war, but his vision 
“was seen as amusing, even entertaining.”
232
     
 
Such a dismissive response is puzzling at face value, as these army officers were plausibly aware 
of the potential for UAVs in combat.  As was outlined above, drones had already been used 
effectively in the Kosovo war and were vital in the U.S.’s defeat of the Taliban government only 
a few months earlier.  Additionally, the use of UAVs continued to increase rapidly post-9/11 and 
have been instrumental in weakening al Qaeda’s ability to wage terror globally.  Thus the 
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situation begs the question – how could knowledgeable military officials so greatly underestimate 
the imminent rise of UAVs’ importance in armed conflicts?  The answer may potentially lie in 
psychological research demonstrating that humans are generally bad at forecasting trends that are 
changing at an exponential rate, which involves quantities that are changing at increasing rates 
over time.  In two such studies, Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975) and Wagenaar (1978) discovered 
that people tend to significantly underestimate the growth rate of exponentially growing 
processes, causing them to project a linear growth rate throughout the future.
233,234
  Such a finding 
means that people generally perceive growth rates as being fixed and unchanging, even if the 
rates are actually doubling after every time period.  This phenomenon is well-encapsulated in a 
puzzle about a genie and the magically doubling penny.  In this (sadly) hypothetical scenario, a 
genie appears before you offering a choice: you can take $1 million upfront, or you can take a 
magic penny that doubles in value every day for the next 30 days.  Wagenaar and Sagaria (1975) 
and Wagenaar (1978)’s findings would suggest that respondents would likely take the $1 million, 
incorrectly predicting that the magic penny would not be as valuable after 30 days.  However, 
performing the necessary calculations reveals that the magic penny would actually be worth over 
$10 million after 30 days.  Examine the chart below diagramming the magic penny’s value 
throughout the 30 days. 
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Figure 8: Magic Penny’s Value throughout the Month: This chart represents the exponential growth of the magic 
penny over a one month period.  Note that the penny’s value increases by large amounts at the very end of the month.  
Ultimately, the magic penny will be worth much more than $1 million. 
  
A major difficulty underlying improper choice selection is that the magic penny’s value does not 
remotely surpass the alternative $1 million until day 27.  Indeed, after 15 days have passed, the 
magic penny is still worth only a paltry $327.68.  The following chart illustrates a roughly linear 
approximation of value’s growth rate throughout the first 15 days, which is the incorrect 
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Figure 9: Psychological Misrepresentation of Exponential Growth: People tend to approximate exponential growth 
linearly (brown dashed line).  Quantities that grow exponentially exhibit initial linear growth before suddenly 
increasing by large amounts.  Although people can roughly estimate initial exponential growth patterns during this 
pseudo-linear phase, they fail to anticipate the eventual departure from this pattern, on average.     
 
If a human approximates the growth rate utilizing the linear equation outlined above, then he/she 
would assume that the magic penny’s value on day 30 would be $221.96, which is five orders of 
magnitude smaller than the correct answer.  Because humans are so bad at correctly extrapolating 
exponentially, they generally fail to answer this puzzle correctly.  Perhaps unexpectedly, follow-
up research revealed that the underestimation worsened as more data was presented, and neither 
mathematical training nor familiarity with the exponentially growing process alleviated the 
underestimation.
235
  Additionally, Lichtenstein and Fischoff (1977) demonstrated that people 
were 65% to 70% confident that they had correctly answered a number of questions correctly 
when they had actually done no better than the chance rate of 50%, thus scientifically 
demonstrating that humans can display overconfidence with their predictions.
236
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Such studies may potentially lend valuable insights into why experienced and knowledgeable 
Army officials would scoff at the notion that UAVs were about to rapidly take center-stage in 
armed conflicts.  Military experts may generally have underestimated the pace at which UAV 
technology would develop by failing to properly account for the fact that the technology is 
advancing at an exponentially growing rate.  As Wagenaar and Timmers (1979) have shown, 
military officers’ familiarity with a plethora of information relevant to growing UAV usage may 
have actually caused them to underestimate the growth trend of UAV usage to an even greater 
extent than the average person.  To refer back to the magic penny metaphor, such experts may 
have assumed that UAV technology usage was roughly as advanced as day one, when the 
technology is actually closer to day 25 where it is poised for an explosive increase in real growth.  
Simple overconfidence obscures underestimation errors.  
 
Compounding the difficulty of understanding the UAV technological growth was the fact that the 
military is highly conservative and arguably displays an obsession with doing things the way they 
have always been done.  For example, the 1925 court-martial of Army Air Service Colonel Billy 
Mitchell for publicly denouncing the Navy and War Departments for negligence in the deaths of 
U.S. airmen in two separate disasters featuring the loss of U.S. aircraft demonstrated the 
military’s discomfort with internal questioning of military policy.
237
  Instead of engaging in a 
painful process of self-examination, the War Department tried and convicted Colonel Mitchell for 
violating the Ninety-Sixth Article of War, which prohibits conduct that discredits the military 
service.
238, 239
  In a 1949 incident dubbed the “Revolt of the Admirals,” three U.S. Navy admirals 
were fired for their desire to appropriate resources to build a new class of supercarriers (i.e. 
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business as usual) instead of long-range nuclear bombers needed for the upcoming Cold War.
240
  
A similar dispute occurred in 2008 when a high ranking U.S. Air Force official was reprimanded 
for “borderline insubordination” after he stated that he would purchase twice as many 
technologically advanced F-22 aircraft as had been authorized, despite their debatable utility in 
the War on Terror.
241
  Thus, the UAV’s increasing involvement in warfare may have simply been 
resisted by the military leadership because the technology was relatively new and threatened 
deeply entrenched operational modes of the establishment. 
 
The belief that an imminent technological revolution will shape the next generation of military 
robots is certainly justified.  Technological change was recognized to be growing at an 
exponential rate as early as 1965 when Gordon Moore, a cofounder of Intel, recognized that the 
number of transistors on a microchip was roughly doubling every two years.
242
  This phenomenon 
was significant because, not only did the increasing number of transistors increase computer 
processing power, but their growing density reduced the distance that electrical currents traveled 
between any two given transistors, also increasing processing speed.  Exponentially-growing 
processing power means that a standard computer today has more processing power than all of 
the mid-1960s Pentagon computers combined.
243
  Indeed, one present-day supercomputer named 
“Purple” can do a number of calculations in six weeks that would take a supercomputer ten years 
ago nearly five thousand years to complete.  The Department of Energy has already contracted 
IBM to construct a new supercomputer that can perform calculations ten times faster than Purple.   
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With exponentially growing processing power comes exponentially decreasing costs.  The cost of 
computer storage is decreasing by roughly 50 percent every fifteen months.
244
  It took Intel thirty-
five years to produce one billion microchips and only four more years to produce the next one 
billion.  A cell phone’s computational power is currently “a thousand times greater and a million 
times less expensive than all of the computing power housed at MIT in 1965.”
245
  In twenty years, 
computers will likely have a million times more computational power than computers today.  
Similar to how transistors and integrated circuits revolutionized electromechanical computational 
methods, current research in carbon nanotechnology, optical computing, and quantum computing 
promises to drive the exponential growth of future digital hardware for the foreseeable future.    
 
Technology's exponential growth has not been restricted to computer applications.  The United 
States Patent Office estimates that the annual number of important discoveries has doubled 
roughly every twenty years.
246
  Additionally, wireless capacity is doubling every nine months, 
internet bandwidth is doubling every twelve months, the number of human genes mapped 
doubled roughly every eighteen months during the human genome project, and the resolution of 
brain scans is doubling every twelve months.  This latter point is particularly relevant, as 
advances in neuroscience relate to the advance of artificial intelligence.  Indeed, assuming that 
technological advances continue to grow at an exponential trend, computer capabilities will likely 
overtake the human brain’s computational power sometime between 2025 and 2030.
247
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Some exponential advances are unequivocally military-driven.  For example, modern-day bomber 
planes have roughly half a million times the killing capacity of a classical Roman soldier.
248
  
During World War II, about 108 planes were required to strike a single target, but by the 
beginning of the 2001 Afghanistan War, a single plane was destroying 4.07 targets on an average 
flight.  These exponential growth rates indicate that rapid changes will not only continue to occur 
over the next few years, but the resulting discoveries may be more advanced than we might 
otherwise expect if we falsely assume the growth rates to be linear.  For example, when scientists 
planned to sequence most of the human genome in a fifteen year span, many mocked the project 
when only 1% of the human genome had been sequenced by the halfway point.
249
  However, 
because critics did not account for the fact that the project's pace was doubling every year, they 
were quite surprised when the entire genome was sequenced on schedule after fifteen years.  
 
High-profile science-fiction movies such as Terminator, The Matrix, and iRobot have 
undoubtedly served as inspiration for the fields of robotics and artificial intelligence.  It is 
unlikely that UAVs will resemble these fictional stories any time in the near future.  However, the 
point is that technological fields – specifically robotics and artificial intelligence – will exhibit 
increasingly larger numbers of advances over the next few years.  The overall evolution of 
technological capabilities throughout the next two decades will likely be far greater and more 
impressive than anyone imagined.  Thus, what is currently science fiction today may become 
reality sooner than anyone thought possible.  Such technological advances will directly impact the 
burgeoning use of UAVs in combat settings by expanding their military effectiveness and 
autonomous capabilities.
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2.1 The Rise of Artificial Intelligence  
 
“I'm sorry, Frank, I think you missed it. Queen to Bishop three, Bishop takes Queen, Knight takes 
Bishop. Mate…Thank you for a very enjoyable game.”  
 
 -HAL (2001: A Space Odyssey) 
 
In addition to rapid technological advances that enable increasingly powerful computer hardware, 
artificial intelligence (AI) software must also be developed to power future UAV autonomy.  
Although the notion that artificial intelligence rivaling the human capacity for intelligent thought 
has been exclusively the realm of science fiction, the exponentially growing number of 
technological advances may plausibly create the proper conditions for realizing this possibility.   
A historic analog is the progression of human flight from a centuries-old fantasy to actuality due 
to technological progress in multiple supporting areas.   
 
For UAVs to successfully interpret complex, confusing environments and make appropriate 
decisions, future AI must be able to dynamically acquire multi-faceted sensory information from 
the environment and analyze the integrated information to interpret the surroundings and select 
behaviors appropriately.  Because real world environments and situations are only partially 
predictable, future AI must be able to categorize the constituent features of its detected sensory 
inputs and make generalizations based on past experiences and mental models, which is 
functionally equivalent to higher-level human cognitive functioning.   
 
While creating AI that can successfully analyze and operate within real environments is very 





29 years after HAL beat Frank at chess in the 2001: A Space Odyssey film – IBM supercomputer 
Deep Blue defeated the reigning world chess champion Garry Kasparov after six matches.
250
 
Although technologically complex, the machine’s ability to interpret the environment was 
conceptually simple.  Because chess is played using a precise set of rules and because there is 
very little dynamically changing information from the actual environment (i.e. the chess board), 
the AI can be programmed to always recognize and interpret all relevant information when 
selecting each move, thus greatly simplifying the design requirements.  Armed with perfect 
knowledge about the environment, Deep Blue relied on “brute force” to analyze 200 million 
positions per second when selecting the best move, a strategy that humans cannot employ due to 
biological constraints.  Deep Blue may not have found the game “very enjoyable,” but its victory 
nevertheless marked a significant milestone in the quest for AI that could surpass human abilities 
at a specific task.   
 
In 2011, another IBM AI named Watson entered the history books when it defeated the top two 
all-time “Jeopardy!” champions in a televised game of “Jeopardy!”
251
  Watson was designed to be 
a “question answering” machine capable of understanding and correctly answering questions 
posed in everyday human language.
252
  Given the complicated nature of “Jeopardy’s!” question 
phrasing, IBM researchers viewed the game show as an ideal tool for developing AI that can 
better-understand natural language.  With its numerous nuances, ambiguities, and complexities, 
computer comprehension of natural language is a research area that has remained elusive to 
computer scientists over the decades.
253
  Such a nebulous problem is significantly more difficult 
for a computer to handle than chess playing, as the rules and mathematics behind chess are well-
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  Additionally, Watson had to understand and answer the questions in a few seconds to 
be competitive with the human contestants.  With 2,800 processor cores and 16 terabytes of 
working memory, Watson can process 80 trillion operations per second.
255
   
 
Watson had to successfully operate in an extremely complex “environment,” as “Jeopardy’s!” 
subject matter could include anything from human knowledge.  Such a limitless array of potential 
questions prevented the preprogramming of questions and answers within Watson’s knowledge 
database.  To deal with this issue, the equivalent of 200 million pages of data was stored into 
Watson’s “brain,” and statistical algorithms were used to identify associations between relevant 
names, words, and phrases that frequently appeared together in the data in response to a particular 
question.
256
  Such an ability to recognize meaningful associations allowed Watson to recognize 
inferences and relationships that are not explicitly stated in the question.  For example, if a 
potential “Jeopardy!” clue was: “The name of this hat is elementary, my dear contestant,” Watson 
could recognize that part of the clue resembles the famous phrase “elementary, my dear Watson,” 
which is commonly associated with Sherlock Holmes.
257
   
 
Such statistical strategies are not new, but Watson’s tremendous speed allowed it to utilize 
roughly a hundred different algorithms simultaneously to search for the correct answer.
258
  A 
second set of algorithms estimates the plausibility of each potential answer, and a particular 
answer is typically favored to the extent that the various search algorithms converge upon it.
259
  If 

















Watson did not estimate that it was sufficiently confident in its answer, then it chose not to 
respond.   
 
Although the questions that Watson can answer are strictly objective facts devoid of any 
judgments, Watson’s ability to understand language, parse complex syntax, and correctly find the 
correct answer to a question in its immense memory storage in only a matter of seconds is a 
phenomenal breakthrough in artificial intelligence that seemed unlikely only a few years ago.  
When initially briefed about designs for creating Watson, IBM executives reportedly dismissed 
the idea outright as being too difficult.
260
  Indeed, such an example demonstrates that even some 
of the best-informed experts in the world do not always recognize the rate at which artificial 
intelligence is being developed.  After some convincing, a team of 15 IBM employees was 
assembled in 2007 to create Watson.  It only took them four years to finish the project and 
achieve this ambitious goal.   
 
In 2005, Sebastian Thrun and his Stanford research group won the Grand Challenge event hosted 
by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
261
  The event featured 195 teams 
from thirty-six states and four countries, each competing for the $2 million grand prize.  The 
object of the challenge was to design an autonomous robotic vehicle that could successfully 
navigate a 132-mile off-road course through Nevada’s Mojave Desert.
262
  Among the challenge’s 
main stipulations was that the robotic vehicles could not receive any human intervention during 
the race.
263
  Consequently, for a vehicle to be competitive, it had to be capable of dynamically 
perceiving its immediate surroundings and use the information to map the safest, most expedient 
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routes to reach the finish line.  Stanford’s winning vehicle, named Stanley, was equipped with a 
suite of detectors and controls, including five Laser Detection and Ranging (LADAR) sensors, 
GPS, three gyroscopes, three accelerometers, a video camera, and onboard computers with 
roughly 100,000 lines of code.
264, 265
  The onboard systems used the sensors to construct a 3D 
model of the surrounding landscape, with which the AI could analyze to make decisions about 
where to travel.   
 
During the early testing phases, Stanley exhibited a 12 percent false positive error rate by 
frequently classifying shadows and other benign features as impassable obstacles.
266
  To reduce 
this error rate, Dr. Thrun’s team implemented a unique innovation not found in the other vehicles: 
a learning and memory algorithm that incorporated its prior driving experience into all decision-
making processes.
267
  During trial runs, Stanley learned how to distinguish good routes from bad 
routes by capturing the reactions and decisions of human drivers, and it incorporated the humans’ 
judgments when making autonomous decisions.
268
  The ability to learn from experience 
tremendously increased Stanley’s flexibility when encountering novel situations by making 
generalizations based on previous experience.  Indeed, programmers would face an impossible 
task if they tried to hard-code a decision-making process for every possible situation that Stanley 
might face.   After extensive training, Stanley’s false positive rate was reduced to 0.00002 
percent, thus allowing Stanley to travel for hundreds of miles error free.
269
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The previous examples demonstrate that current artificial intelligence already displays 
tremendous analytical, learning, and memory capacities that would be crucial for future 
autonomous UAVs.  Autonomy is a daunting proposition, and the previous examples of blooming 
artificial intelligence are bellwethers that future research can extend autonomy to military and 
intelligence applications.   To successfully navigate confusing battlefields and extreme 
environments while executing missions, UAVs must sense the environment, process and 
remember important stimuli, problem solve and respond to the perceptual environment 
accordingly, and adapt future behaviors to past experiences.  Most crucially for full autonomy, 
UAVs will be required to make human-like judgments regarding ambiguous stimuli in a manner 
that minimizes mistakes and unnecessary harm to friendly forces and civilians.  Indeed, recent 
examples from the CIA’s drone program in Pakistan suggest that UAVs will be operating in 
environments where enemy militants are extremely difficult to distinguish from civilians for the 
foreseeable future.   
 
Although much literature has been published regarding the rise of UAV autonomy in recent 
years, very little attention has been publicly paid regarding how autonomy can be successfully 
implemented in UAVs; viz. how do UAVs acquire such decision-making abilities?  To develop 
sufficient artificial intelligence, one need only look to neuroscience for answers.  The human 
brain is well-equipped to handle these same challenges, and thus serves as a useful model for 
developing necessary artificial intelligence.  The problem is challenging because emulating 
biological neural systems represents a dramatic departure from how normal computer systems 
operate, as the two have several fundamental differences.  For example, digital computers 
generally contain a central processing unit (CPU) and a memory store.  The CPU fetches data 





Consequently, computers carry out complex operations by executing millions of operations per 
second in series.
270
   
 
In the human brain, there are no clearly-defined memory and processing locations, as the two 
coexist within individual neurons.  These cells receive electrochemical inputs from upstream 
neurons and send electrochemical signals to activate downstream neurons.
271
  This process 
repeats cyclically, thus creating a chain of signaling that passes information through a coupled 
network of neurons.  These cells are concatenated in large, densely interwoven networks 
throughout the central nervous system.   
 
Figure 10: Simple Biological Neural Network Overview: (Left) A conceptual schematic of a simple biological neural 
network is outlined above, with each circle representing a neuron and each arrow representing a neural connection.  
Input Layer neurons typically represent sensory neurons that receive specific inputs from the environment and pass the 
information to interneurons within the Hidden Layer.  These interneurons combine and filter the information that they 
receive from multiple sensory inputs before ultimately selecting an appropriate action by passing the filtered 
information to a neuron that initiates a behavioral output (Output Layer).  More complex neural networks feature 
multi-layered networks with many additional interneurons and connections.  Consequently, information processing 
occurs at each neural connection as complex stimuli features are decomposed and simultaneously processed.272   
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(Right) A confocal microscopy image of two neurons extracted from a rat brain and transfected with Green 
Fluorescent Protein to make them visible.  Notice the extensive branching patterns of each neuron which constitutes the 
inputs and outputs to other neurons within the network.   
 
The brain is estimated to contain 100 billion neurons, with each neuron receiving inputs from 
1,000 to 10,000 other neurons.
273
  Such figures suggest that the human brain could contain up to 
1,000 trillion connections.  Unlike computers, biological neural networks can solve complex 
problems by simultaneously performing millions or billions of operations in parallel.   
 
Thus, differences in architecture between computers and biological neural networks force these 
systems to solve problems using very different strategies.  Consequently, such differences allow 
biological neural networks to easily solve problems that are extremely difficult for computers.  
For example, humans can generally read each other’s handwriting with ease, despite the various 
nuances and styles afforded to individual characters unique to each person.  By contrast, most 
computers cannot perform this simple task.
274
  However, evidence has surfaced in recent years 
indicating that specialized computer hardware is already being developed to mimic biological 
neural networks and capitalize on the advantages that such networks afford to problem solving.  
For example, although far inferior to the parallel processing found in the human brain, Watson’s 
2,800 processor cores allows it to perform many decision-making algorithms simultaneously, thus 
increasing both the machine’s speed and accuracy.   
 
In August 2011, IBM announced its newest creation: two prototype computer chips that are 
“designed to imitate the human brain’s ability to understand its surroundings, act on things that 
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happen around it and make sense of complex data.”
275
  Such hardware will “let a new generation 
of computers, called ‘cognitive computers,’ learn through their experiences and form their own 
theories about what those experiences mean.”
276
  One of these cores contains 262,144 artificial 
programmable synapses, and the other contains 65,536 “learning synapses.”
277
  Ultimately, IBM 
researchers hope to develop a one-square-centimeter chip containing 1 million artificial neurons 
with 10 billion total connections, indicating that 10,000 connections would exist per artificial 
neuron, on average.   
 
This technology emulates the neural connectivity found in human brains.  Considering that in 
2007, the combined processing power of all the world’s computers was estimated to be equivalent 
to the processing power of one human brain, the creation of these advanced chips would be very 
impressive.
278
    IBM researchers believe that such chips could serve as sensors that could monitor 
environments and report interesting activity that deviates from a desired state.  For example, the 
chips could monitor the sights, smells, and temperature to ensure that grocery store produce is 
still fresh or send an alert to the appropriate authorities if it learns through observation that a 
given traffic intersection is dangerous. 
 
Complementing such revolutionary hardware, the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects 
Agency is currently funding the development of project ICArUS, a computational model that 
represents how seven major brain systems interact to produce “the human ability to draw 
inferences from data that is sparse, noisy, and uncertain.”
279
  Such a model would ideally have the 
                                                          
275






 Hilbert and Lopez, 2011  
279





ability to predict the idiosyncrasies of neural processing involved in interpreting data, such as 
cognitive bias.  Consequently, such a model could improve human decision-making by alerting 
humans when bias is likely to interfere with judgments, and it could even perform routine 
analysis, thus freeing human analysts to perform other tasks.   
 
Although both IBM and the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency’s research is aimed 
at supporting human tasks, the handwriting is on the wall: in this new era of military robotics, 
such increasingly intelligent computer hardware and computational models will inevitably find 
useful homes in automated UAVs.  The ability to learn from experience, perform analysis, form 
theories about the meaning of experiences, and execute actions based on complex analysis are all 
clearly important traits in truly autonomous systems.  For example, a UAV could recognize 
behavior resembling the planting of an improvised explosive by accounting for the observed 
actions, the region’s history regarding such attacks, and the frequency that similar observed 
behavior has led to the discovery of an improvised explosive device.  If the UAV is sufficiently 
convinced with a great degree of confidence that such a hostile act is occurring, it could execute a 
lethal strike.  For example, the UAV could run facial and voice analysis to determine if the 
suspect is a known militant.  It could then calculate the blast radius that would result from 
deploying each weapon in the UAV’s arsenal and select the weapon, time, and location for 
executing the lethal strike that minimizes collateral damage and civilian casualties.  If the UAV 
needs more information, it could alert the appropriate authorities to the location of the suspected 
improvised explosive device, follow the suspect, and gather additional information about the 
suspect’s “pattern of life”, not so dissimilar from what human UAV operators do today.
280
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The suspect’s behaviors and tendencies could also be analyzed to locate additional suspicious 
behavior or useful intelligence.  For example, does the suspect interact with other known 
militants?  Does the suspect possess outlawed weapons?  Does the suspect routinely plant strange 
objects near roads frequented by U.S. soldiers?  Does the suspect place phone calls in which 
he/she admits to partaking in militant actions?  Was an improvised explosive device ultimately 
found at the location the suspect was first spotted?  Thus the UAV would analyze all relevant 
behaviors when deciding which actions to perform.  If the drone ultimately concludes that the 
suspect is hostile, it could engage in a lethal strike at a time that would maximize the number of 
known hostiles killed while minimizing collateral damage, based on the “pattern of life” analysis.  
If the analysis is ultimately inconclusive, the drone could still file a report about its suspicions to 
the proper authorities. 
 
The ability to emulate the biological brain and human cognition is clearly a fruitful objective, as 
is evident from the IBM and the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency’s latest 
research projects.  Such a goal clearly has advantages for UAVs, as it allows UAVs to perform 
complex analysis and actions with decreasing human oversight.  How exactly does artificial 
intelligence software support such human-like cognitive abilities?  This question will be 
addressed in the next section
 
2.2 Neural Networks – An Ideal Artificial Intelligence Architecture for Autonomous 
Systems 
To operate autonomously in complex, confusing environments, there are compelling reasons to 
design UAV artificial intelligence to emulate the operation of the human brain’s neural network.  
Building on the previous section’s explanation of the architectural differences between neural 
networks and standard computer functioning, the current section explores how neural networks 
function to produce human cognition and human-like cognitive abilities in artificial systems and 
why these abilities are important in achieving UAV autonomy.   
 
According to Lieberman (2004), artificial neural networks are simple systems that have three 
basic features:  
(1) The network is composed of interconnected neurons, with each neuron connecting to 
every other neuron in the simplest networks.  
(2) When a neuron is activated, the activity is transferred to other neurons connected to it in a 
manner proportional to the strengths of each connection. (e.g. if neuron A is strongly 
connected to neuron B but weakly connected to neuron C, then activation of neuron A 
will transfer a large amount of activation to neuron B but a weak amount of activation to 
neuron C.) 
(3) If two neurons are simultaneously active, their connection with each other strengthens, 
thus increasing the likelihood that future activation of one neuron will correspondingly 
activate the other.
281
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Not surprisingly, such features strongly resemble both research in biological neural networks and 
Pavlov’s assumptions when he described an associative learning process – called classical 
conditioning – in biological organisms roughly 100 years ago.  In a typical classical conditioning 
paradigm, an initial neutral stimulus called a conditioned stimulus (CS) is paired with a 
biologically important event called an unconditioned stimulus (US).  In a hypothetical learning 
paradigm characterizing early psychological research, the test subjects might be rats, the CS 
might be presentation of an audible tone, and the US might be presentation of brief electric shock.  
After a number of CS→US pairings, the CS acquires the ability to elicit a new learned response 
called the conditioned response (CR).  For example, freezing (cessation of body movement) is a 
prominent defensive fear reaction in rodents.  Through classical conditioning in which a tone is 
repeatedly presented with shock (tone→shock) in rats, the tone can acquire the ability to elicit 
defensive freezing when presented alone.  In the modern analysis of associative learning, classical 





  In the present example, the rat freezes when the tone is presented because the tone 
activates a memory of the shock.  Because the shock is stressful, the animal engages in defensive 
freezing.   
 
To translate this scenario into biological terms, presentation of shock activates the “US” neuron, 
which is hard-wired from birth to activate the response or “R” neuron, thus eliciting the freezing 
behavior.  The “CS” neuron is activated by the tone, and before learning has occurred, CS 
neuron’s activation does not increase R neuron’s activation.  However, after CS neuron and US 
neuron are simultaneously activated by several tone→shock pairings, the connection between CS 
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neuron and US neuron becomes strengthened, thus allowing the CS neuron to reliably activate the 
US neuron, which in turn activates the R neuron (CS neuron→US neuron→R neuron).  In other 
words, the tone acquires the ability to elicit the freezing response by acquiring the ability to 
activate the neural circuitry that produces a behavioral response to shock. 
 
Figure 11: Classical Conditioning Overview: Illustrated above is a standard classical conditioning paradigm. A 
previously neutral stimulus (Conditioned Stimulus) acquires the ability to elicit a response after it has been paired with 
the presentation of an Unconditioned Stimulus that naturally elicits a response.  Conceptually, the Conditioned 
Stimulus, Unconditioned Stimulus, and the Response can all be mapped to individual neurons.  After the co-
presentation of the Conditioned and Unconditioned Stimuli, the CS and US Neurons become simultaneously activated, 
causing the connection strength between these two neurons to be increased.  Consequently, the subsequent activation of 
CS Neuron alone will activate the US Neuron, which will activate the R Neuron, producing the behavioral response.         
 
Naturally, classical conditioning analysis is not restricted to rats.  Because classical conditioning 
can involve the acquisition of new fear behavior in humans
284
, considerable research has been 
directed to understanding the extent to which classical conditioning of fear might underlie human 
fear and phobias.
285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290
  Basically, classical conditioning is a kind of predictive 
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learning in which organisms can learn to predict the future occurrence of biologically important 
events.  In this context, some have suggested that classical conditioning represents a mechanism 
that enables organisms to learn the causal structure of their environments.
291
   
   
Biological research into neuronal signaling supports the hypothesis that neural connectivity can 
dynamically change based on the simultaneous activation of two connected neurons.  
Specifically, Long Term Potentiation (LTP) is the molecular phenomenon that mediates these 
changes in connectivity at the synaptic junctures that serve as the functional interfaces between 
biological neurons.  Synapses in the hippocampus contain N-Methyl d-aspartate (NMDA) 
receptors, and research has implicated these receptors as having a key role in LTP.
292
  The 
NMDA receptors specifically bind to the neurotransmitter Glutamate, a signaling molecule in the 
nervous system that transfers information (i.e. activation) across the synaptic gap separating two 
neurons.   
 
Figure 12: Synaptic Transmission Overview: This diagram represents normal synaptic transmission (i.e. information 
passing) between two neurons.  Notice that these neurons are not physically connected, and are thus divided by a gap 
(synapse).  To get information across the gap, the neuron on the left (presynaptic neuron) releases neurotransmitters 
(red circles) that float across the gap via passive diffusion.  Protein complexes (receptors) located on the surface of the 
right neuron (postsynaptic neuron) physically bind to the neurotransmitters if they happen to randomly come into 
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contact.  This binding changes the 3-dimensional structure of the receptor complex, thus forming a membrane pore that 
allows ions to enter the postsynaptic neuron.  This ion influx initiates a chain-reaction of events that passes information 
through the postsynaptic neuron, which will then signal additional neurons in the network via this same mechanism.293   
 
Initial binding of glutamate to NMDA receptors has a surprising result – no activation of the 
postsynaptic neuron occurs.  However, earlier research of general LTP mechanisms in other areas 





  Thus, the glutamate molecules were successfully binding to the receptor and the 
receptor properly changed its conformation to reveal a pore through the cell membrane, but 
calcium (Ca
2+
) ions were unable to pass through because Mg
2+
 blocked the pore.   
 
However, this blockage could be eliminated through the activation of a second receptor, known as 
the alpha-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid (AMPA) receptor, which also 
forms a (unobstructed) pore through the cell membrane allowing sodium (Na
+
) ions to pass into 
the postsynaptic neuron.  If sufficient activation of AMPA and NMDA receptors occurs 
simultaneously, then the Mg
2+
 molecule will be expelled out of the NMDA receptor, thus 
removing the pore blockage.  This expulsion allows Ca
2+
 to enter the postsynaptic cell via the 
NMDA receptor channels and triggers the insertion of even more AMPA receptors into the 
postsynaptic membrane and increases the excitability (i.e. propensity to produce activation) of 
previously existing AMPA receptors.
295
  This increase in AMPA receptors makes the 
postsynaptic neuron more sensitive to future glutamate release, and thus, more easily activated.  
Highlighting their role in learning, research has shown that blocking NMDA receptors in rats 
blocks spatial learning.
296
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Figure 13: Long-Term Potentiation Overview: This diagram illustrates the dynamics of NMDA and AMPA receptors.  
The glutamate neurotransmitter (red circles) are capable of binding to both of these receptors upon contact, creating a 
pore for ion travel through the postsynaptic neuron membrane.  However, ions cannot initially pass through the pore 
complex formed when glutamate binds to the NMDA receptor because the pore is blocked by a magnesium (Mg2+) ion.  
Once glutamate facilitates sodium (Na+) passage through the postsynaptic membrane by binding to AMPA receptors, 
the Mg2+ ions will be expelled from the NMDA receptor pores as long as the NMDA receptors are bound to glutamate 
molecules.  Once the NMDA pore has been cleared, calcium (Ca2+) ions can enter the postsynaptic neuron through the 
NMDA receptor and induce both short-term and long-term changes that make the postsynaptic neuron more responsive 
to future activation from the presynaptic neuron.297   
     
LTP is a robust phenomenon that can last from hours to years.  The increasing number of AMPA 
receptors in the postsynaptic neuron’s membrane and modifications to their protein structures 
accounts for the initial increase of synaptic strengthening (i.e. strengthening of the connection 
between the two neurons)
298, 299
, but other factors increase this effect over longer durations.  The 
NMDA-mediated Ca
2+
 influx into the postsynaptic neuron activates cAMP response element 
binding protein-1 (CREB-1), a transcription factor that ultimately activates further DNA-
mediated protein synthesis (i.e. gene expression).
300
  This additional protein synthesis is a 
relatively slow process, but it leads to robust structural modifications to signaling elements along 
the synapse that maintain LTP for long durations.  The delayed onset of protein synthesis and the 
initial insertion of more AMPA receptors in the membrane could potentially represent a 
difference in short-term memory and long-term memory mechanisms. 
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In addition to identifying the molecular mechanisms that can account for the rapid induction and 
maintenance of LTP, research has also identified a mechanism that is responsible for the selective 
associative aspects of LTP.  Scientists have found evidence that local protein synthesis in the 
postsynaptic terminal following the initial induction of LTP serve as a “synaptic tag” that is 
required for capturing the products of the CREB-1 induced protein synthesis (via gene 
transcription).
301
  These synaptic tags last for only a few hours, and they serve as a mechanism for 
selectively enhancing only those synapses that were involved in inducing the initial LTP.  
Additionally, multiple synapses can acquire the necessary synaptic tag simultaneously if all of the 
synapses contributed to the depolarization of the postsynaptic neuron.   
 
Synaptic tagging potentially allows multiple stimuli to be associated with each other in memory, 
thus allowing complex memories to be broken into functional units and distributed throughout the 
neural network.  For example, a functional area of the human brain known as the hippocampus 
plays a key role in non-discreet contextual memory formation (e.g. subtle environmental features, 
such as lighting, smell, olfaction, and texture, among many other possibilities)
302
, which could 
simply be represented as a collection of various stimuli that were sensed at any given moment and 
associated in time through synaptic tagging.  Thus, LTP is an excellent candidate for the 
molecular substrate of the memory formation process for three reasons:  
(1) LTP represents plasticity in the brain’s cerebral cortex that can change with experience in 
response to new stimuli.  
(2) LTP is long lasting. 
(3) LTP allows for the association of multiple stimuli.   
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When considering that each neuron receives 1,000 to 10,000 inputs from other neurons classical 
conditioning research and molecular synaptic plasticity findings have served as the foundation of 
modern artificial neural network theory.  Indeed, modern artificial neural network theory attempts 
to extend such a model’s ability to predict complex behavioral phenomena by focusing on 
associations formed within huge networks of simultaneously activated neurons (i.e. as opposed to 
focusing only on changes at individual neuron-to-neuron connections in isolation).
303
  
Additionally, artificial neural network researchers have attempted to precisely quantify the 
mathematical relationships associated with changing neural connections to both explain and 
simulate the processes of learning and decision-making based on prior learning.
304
  Because of the 
huge number of neural connections, dynamically changing neural connectivity patterns have 
required computers to model.  The power of such simulations to model human behavior depends 
on the mathematical formula used to adjust the strengths of various neural connections.   
 
One of the most influential equations describing neural plasticity-based learning is the delta 
rule.
305
  To describe the delta rule, consider the previously discussed classical conditioning 
scenario that is summarized in the diagram below. 
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Figure 13: Neural Substrate of Simple Classical Conditioning: This diagram summarizes the basic interactive 
components of a conceptual biological neural network.  The circles represent neurons, and the arrows represent neural 
connections.  The CS and US neurons are both activated by sensory neurons that detect stimuli from the external 
environment.  The CS→US connection represents an internal connection because CS-induced activation of the US 
neuron indirectly originates from external sources.   
 
Initially, when a rat detects electric shock, a sensory neuron activates the US neuron, which 
activates the R neuron, which initiates the freezing behavioral response.  In this case, the sensory 
neuron signaling the presence of electric shock is considered the US neuron’s external input 
because this input source directly signals an event that was sensed from the environment.  If 
auditory tones have been reliably paired with the presentation of shock, then the connection 
between the CS and US neurons will strengthen to the extent that activation of the CS neuron 
alone will produce subsequent activations of the US and R neurons, thus eliciting the freezing 
response.  CS input into the US neuron represents an internal input because the input is 
originating from within the neural network (as opposed to the environment).  According to the 
delta rule, each time the CS and US neurons are simultaneously active, “the change in the internal 
connection between two neurons (∆I) is proportional to the difference between the internal and 
external inputs.”
306
  In other words: 
∆I = c∙(external input – internal input) 
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where c is some constant.
307
   
 
Thus, in a naïve neural network, new associations are initially learned quickly after only a few 
associations, followed by a period of gradual, slow refinement of connective strength.  
Ultimately, the connectivity between two neurons will be at their strongest when the connective 
strength of the internal input is equal to the connective strength of the external output.  At this 
point, no additional associations will have any impact on connectivity.  In the previous example, 
this is the point when the tone would acquire the ability to produce the freezing behavior as 
strongly and reliable as the detection of electrical shock.  Note that the learning process will slow 
down as the difference between the internal and external inputs decreases. 
 
Interestingly – and perhaps not surprisingly – although the delta rule models the mathematical 
relationship of neural connection plasticity believed to underlie learning and behavioral 
responding, the rule strongly resembles mathematical models independently developed to 
describe associative learning in psychology research.  Of particular note is the Rescorla-Wagner 
model of associative learning, which has remained influential over the past several decades.
308
  In 
this model, the strength of a CS-US association is dynamic and can change as a function of each 
new CS-US temporal pairing.  Just like the delta rule, a fundamental construct of the model is 
“associative strength.”  The degree to which the CS-US connection is strengthened after each 
pairing is expressed as: 
Equation 1:  ∆VN = αβ(λ - VN-1) 
And current total associative strength of a CS after each CS-US pairing is expressed as: 
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Equation 2:   VN = ∆VN + VN-1 
∆V represents the amount of learning that occurs as a result of a given CS-US pairing.  V 
represents current cumulative learning to the CS (current associative strength).  α and β are fixed 
learning rate parameters analogous to salience of the CS (α) and intensity of the US (β).  λ 
represents the total amount of learning that can be supported by a given US.  According to the 
model, there is a limit to how much associative strength a given US can support (specified as λ).  
Thus, each CS-US association produces some new knowledge (∆V) and consequently total 
current knowledge increases (V).  However, this increase will continue only so far because there 
is a limit on total knowledge that can be acquired in a given situation (λ).  When the current total 
learning (current value of V) becomes equivalent to asymptotic associative strength that can be 
acquired in that situation (value of λ), learning stops and further CS-US pairings will not produce 
any new learning.  This occurs when the value of V reaches the value of λ.  When this happens, 
the parenthetical term (λ – VN-1) will equal zero and no further learning can occur.  Equation 1 
functionally reads as “how much associative learning will be incremented on pairing N is 
determined by how much can be learned, minus what has been learned so far.”  Equation 2 
functionally reads as “current total learning at the completion of pairing N is equal to the amount 
of learning that occurs on pairing N plus the total learning accumulated before pairing N 
occurred.”   
 
Thus, the delta rule developed independently in neural network research resembles mathematical 
models of associative learning in psychology research.  Both models place great emphasis on the 
belief that learning/neural changes initially occur rapidly before slowing down and eventually 
stopping.  In both cases, this process is a function of prior learning.  In the Rescorla-Wagner 





given stimulus.  According to the delta rule, a neural connection stops strengthening because the 
internal input has “learned” that it identically represents the external input with regards to 
producing a behavioral response.  To translate this to our classical conditioning example, synaptic 
plasticity stops because the organism has learned that it should respond equally to the detection of 
a tone or a shock.  The fact that these two mathematical models so closely align provides 
credibility that they actually describe the same process from two different angles.  The Rescorla-
Wagner model accurately represents associative learning at a behavioral level, the delta rule 
describes the dynamics of changes in neural connections underlying behavioral learning, and 
extensive biological research in long term potentiation (LTP) provides a detailed molecular 
mechanism demonstrating exactly how changes in strength between neurons occurs to 
accommodate learning processes and appropriate behavioral selection processes in biological 
neural networks.   
 
Given our significant recent inroads in scientific understanding unifying aspects of learning, 
behavior, and dynamically changing biological neural circuitry connections, the eventual 
development of artificial intelligence that can simulate human-like cognitive functions seems 
plausible.  To this end, McClelland and Rumelhart conducted research on distributed information 
processing using an artificial neural network [computer model] containing thousands of neurons 
to demonstrate that simple neural networks could form “concepts,” which are abstractions that 
require the combination of several different memories to construct.  For example, recognition of a 
dog would be a concept, as a dog is composed of numerous features, such as a tail, legs, fur, and 
ears.  This research effectively extends the Rescorla-Wagner model beyond the scope of 
modeling only a few neurons at once.
309
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A brief description of artificial neural network organization is presented here to give the reader a 
working knowledge of how these networks can support complex information processing, 
although this description will avoid detailed technical complexities.  According to McClelland 
and Rumelhart, an artificial neural network is governed by many properties.
310
  First, the artificial 
neural network is composed of simple, highly interconnected units (analogous to neurons) that 
“take on activation values, and communicate with other units by sending signals modulated by 
weights associated with the connections between the units.”
311
  Each weight can have an 
activation value of any real number ranging from -1 to 1, with a negative weight signifying that 
the activation of one unit would decrease the probability that units receiving its output would fire.  
The closer to -1, the more statistically unlikely such connected units would form an activation 
chain, and vice versa.  In other words, weights are simply mathematical abstractions that simulate 
changes in voltage strength between two neurons in biological neural networks.  Each unit may 
represent a basic memory, sensory input, or a complex concept that is activated by receiving 
simultaneous inputs from activated units representing the concept’s constituent parts (e.g. units 
coding for ears, fur, legs, etc.).  Alternatively, simple representations, such as the color of an 
object, might be encoded in a distributed pattern of activation from many units throughout the 
network.   
 










Figure 14: Single Unit Activation: Input signals originate from upstream units within the network.  The strength of 
these inputs is modified by mathematical synaptic weights, thus calibrating the individual input strengths as a function 
of their importance on each downstream unit.  All calibrated inputs are summed at the downstream unit (summing 
junction).  If the summed product is greater than a threshold value, then an output value is produced, which serves as 
an input to the next downstream neuron within the network.   
Picture Source: http://www.learnartificialneuralnetworks.com/#Mathematical 
 
 
Figure 15: Summation Junction Algorithm: This algorithm represents the mathematical expression for summing a 
unit’s weighted inputs (summation junction) when determining the unit’s output. Vk represents the summation value (i.e. 
activation value), wkj represents the weight associated with input j, and xj represents the raw value of input j.  See 
Figure 14 for the illustrative representation of these relationships. 






Figure 16: Possible Unit Output Values: Output values generally range from -1 to 1, and they can represent 
continuous or step functions.  In other words, a range of summed values can be mapped to a single output value, or the 
summed value can be the output value.   
Picture Source: http://www.learnartificialneuralnetworks.com/#Mathematical 
     
An artificial neural network is assumed to have modular organization of the constituent units, 
with each module connecting to other models via inputs and outputs.  According to McClelland 
and Rumelhart, the “state of each module represents a synthesis of the states of all of the modules 
it receives inputs from.  Some of the inputs will be from relatively more sensory modules, closer 
to the sensory end-organs of one modality or another.  Others will come from relatively more 





at the abstract end of several different modalities.”
312
  Thus, the artificial neural network’s 
“mental state” is a reflection of the precise constellation of units and modules that is activated at a 
given moment.  Information processing represents the dynamic changes from one mental state to 
another.  In such a system, knowledge is represented by the mathematical values of the weights 
(see Figures 14 and 15) governing each unit’s activation within an activation chain, as these 
values allow patterns of activation to be reliably recreated and accessed when faced with the same 
inputs originating from within the network and from the environment.  Because the weights 
represent the strength of each inputs’ influence on a downstream unit’s output, these weights 
numerically encapsulate which relationships are meaningful within the network.    
 
If knowledge represents the mathematical weights governing the dynamics of network activation, 
then learning and memory involves the adjustments of specific weights to capture traces of 
previous pattern activations using the delta rule described earlier so that these network activations 
can be easily and reliably recreated.
313
  For example, if the weight value between unit A and unit 
B is 0, then no meaningful connection exists between these units, regardless of unit A’s input 
value to unit B.  Unit A’s input will be multiplied by the weight (which is 0), thus rendering the 
input insignificant in the summing junction.  Consequently, the connection would not be included 
in the functional network in which unit B is embedded.       
 
If, through the process of learning, the network recognizes that unit A and unit B have a 
meaningful connection, the weight value is positively adjusted in accordance with the delta rule, 
thus allowing unit A’s input to meaningfully contribute to unit B’s activation.  Weight adjustment 
occurs “to make the internal input to each unit have the same effect on the unit that the external 









input has on the unit.  That is, given a particular pattern to be stored, we want to find a set of 
connections such that the internal input to each unit from all of the other units matches the 
external input to that unit.”
314
  With appropriate weight tweaking, mental states and knowledge 
acquired from the external environment can be independently reproduced by the internal network 
at times and places absent of any original environmental context.   
 
Figure 17: Representation of Learning in a Simple Neural Network: This diagram explores the role of weights in 
defining the activation relationship among units (i.e. neurons) within a simple network.   
In the Pre-Training diagram, notice that the Sensory Neuron→US Neuron connection and the US Neuron→R Neuron 
connections have a weight of 1, meaning that these neuron pairs are as tightly coupled as possible.  In both cases, 
activation of the input neuron will subsequently produce activation of the output neuron so long as the output neuron 
receives input from only one neuron (as is the case in this example).  The CS Neuron→US Neuron has a weight of 0, 
meaning that the CS Neuron is currently neutral; its activation has no impact on the subsequent activation of the US 
Neuron. 
In the Post-Training diagram, classical conditioning has occurred to the point where the presentation of a tone 
produces the freezing behavioral response.  Notice that this learning has been encapsulated by the change in weight 
between the CS Neuron→US Neuron, which now has a value of 1.  This new value indicates that the network has 
learned that the tone (CS Neuron) reliably predicts the onset of shock, subsequently adjusting the weight to reflect this 
newly-discovered tight coupling.  Future presentations of the tone alone will now activate the US Neuron, thus creating 
a CS Neuron→US Neuron→R Neuron activation chain.  
 
McClelland and Rumelhart trained such an artificial neural network to accurately distinguish dogs 
and cats from each other by training the network to recognize and synthesize the constituent parts 







of each animal to produce the recognition.
315
  For example, the activation of each unit within the 
network was sensitive to a dog’s specific feature, including its tail, legs, fur, and ears.  To 
increase recognition flexibility, the network was trained to recognize dogs by showing it dogs that 
had three of these typical features along with an atypical feature (e.g. a dog might have short 
legs).  After each presentation, the units coding for the typical features would be reliably 
activated most of the time across the 50 training presentations, and thus these units would become 
tightly coupled.  Perhaps the study’s most interesting finding is that the network could recognize 
new dogs that the network had never been exposed to before, indicating that the artificial neural 
network could accurately make generalizations to novel situations based on prior experience.
316
  
In this study, the network was able to generalize because the new dog had some features that were 
typical to all dogs.  The units coding for these typical features successfully activated the 
constellation of units that encode all of a dog’s features through the tight coupling of these units 
during training, thus allowing the network to recognize the new dog.  The network’s 
generalization was robust, even when it was trained to recognize dogs and cats, both of which 
share many features in common.
317
   
 
The ability to train artificial neural networks through examples is among its most attractive 
features.  Given the nearly infinite number of potential mental states and decisions required to 
operate in real world environments, hard-coding autonomous robots to appropriately handle all 
possible situations is impractical, at best.  In addition to the impossibly long and complex code 
required for such an approach, programmers would be unlikely to know how to respond in every 
possible potential situation, themselves.   Thus, artificial neural networks are a superior solution 











because they enable an artificial intelligence that is specifically designed to learn from previous 
experience and adapt future behavior accordingly, even in novel situations.   
 
Although this approach is designed to emulate the superior learning capabilities of biological 
systems, artificial neural networks are not constrained by many of the limitations inherent in 
biological systems.    For example, robots never get bored or tired, and they will continue to fine-
tune any necessary training exercises for as long as necessary.  Additionally, all knowledge 
learned through the diligent training of one robot can be directly uploaded into all other robots of 
the same type.  Thus, only a small number of robots are needed to establish the appropriate 
weights for any desired number of robot clones.   Training is greatly expedited because feedback 
from real life operations can be immediately incorporated into all similar robots, despite the fact 
that they did not experience the situation firsthand.  Lastly, if a robot makes a decision that 
humans deem to be a mistake, algorithms exist for isolating the units most responsible for the 
error within extremely complex artificial neural networks and adjusting their weights accordingly 
to prevent repeat offenses.
318
   
 
Examples already exist of such successful training strategies.  As was noted earlier, Stanley – 
Stanford’s winning submission in the 2005 DARPA Grand Challenge – was trained by 
incorporating the decisions of its early human drivers into its own decision-making process, thus 
tremendously reducing its error rate.  Instead of wasting time trying to hard-wire Stanley to 
handle all possible driving scenarios, the Stanford team showed Stanley how to drive.   
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Other examples of such artificial learning include adaptive quadrotors, which are 4-bladed 
helicopters that could fit in one hand, that learn to maintain steady flight while resisting the 
wind.
319
  At first the quadrotors are not very good at this task, but after several training runs, they 
quickly learn to make the appropriate adjustments.  Similar to McClelland and Rumelhart, 
researchers at Cornell’s Personal Robotics Laboratory are teaching robots to recognize 
categorical groups of objects based on their features.
320
  Researchers in Switzerland have 
developed robots with artificial neural networks that not only learned how to find food, but also 
learned to hide their visual signals from other robots to avoid sharing the food with them.
321
  
Thus, training of the artificial neural network yielded an adaptive social phenomenon that was not 
explicitly hard-coded.   
 
Future UAVs could be trained to execute their missions in ways similar to these examples.  For 
example, the Predator UAV’s 950,000 hours of flight has produced countless hours of sensor 
data.
322
  A subset of this data could be converted into a training package for all UAV aircraft that 
have similar sensor payloads and execute similar missions, such as ISR and lethal strike.  Similar 
to how Stanley was trained by observing and learning from examples of human driving, UAVs 
could use this training package of human remotely-piloted missions to learn how humans 
executed the missions.  Additionally, all UAV artificial intelligence could continuously observe 
and learn from ongoing remotely-piloted UAVs while autonomy is slowly phased into UAVs.  If 
an autonomous UAV commits an error, mathematical algorithms can be used to determine the 
source of the error and correct it.   
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In summary, for UAV autonomy to successfully handle extremely complex, high-stakes 
environments requiring appropriate dynamic behavioral adjustments and generalizations when 
facing novel situations, a strong case can be made that artificial intelligence should be modeled 
on the human’s biological neural network system because it is already well-designed to learn and 
perform such tasks.  Psychological and biological research into the nature of the human nervous 
system has identified biological design and operation features that should be emulated in artificial 
intelligence systems for UAVs.  Artificial neural network research demonstrates that existing 
software models can be used to provide UAV autonomy with human-like learning and 
information processing capabilities.  In fact, IBM’s recent advances in hardware have created 
computer chips that functionally resemble biological neurons, thus allowing artificial neural 
networks to capitalize on physical architecture to achieve parallel processing capabilities never 
seen before.
323
   
 
Although current research falls short of producing artificial neural networks that can match 
humanity’s decision making and information prowess, the fact that technology is advancing at an 
exponential rate suggests that such ability will occur faster than expected.  When asked to 
estimate the date when humanoid robots would be introduced into combat situations in an 
infantry role, a survey of scientists predicted 2020.
324
  Experience with these autonomous ground 
robots is indicative of similar challenges regarding the development of artificial intelligence for 
UAVs.  This predicted capability is only 8 years in the future, and although the projection could 
be way off, the previously described research on exponential trends suggests that they could well 
be overestimating the time required to develop the necessary technology.  
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2.3 Outlining a Future Strategic Vision for Autonomous UAVs 
So far, the UAV’s history as a remotely-piloted ISR and strike platform has been reviewed.  
Additionally, the advantages and challenges of current UAVs have been explored, along with a 
potential artificial intelligence model for achieving future UAV autonomy.  However, the basic 
question remains: given the potential legal and ethical problems, why should UAV autonomy be 
pursued and favored over the successful, existing system of remotely-piloted UAVs?   
 
At first glance, discussions of armed, autonomous robots frequently invite popular culture jokes 
or outright dismissal.  In casual conversations, the subject frequently invokes images of 
Terminators attempting to annihilate their human creators.  In more serious conversations, both 
leading industry and military leaders have expressed serious doubts regarding the feasibility and 
likelihood of UAV autonomy.  For example, U.S. Air Force captain Patrick Eberle noted in the 
Air and Space Power Journal that “[in] some cases, the potential exists to remove the man from 
harm’s way. Does this mean there will no longer be a man in the loop? No. Does this mean that 
brave men and women will no longer face death in combat? No. There will always be a need for 
the intrepid souls to fling their bodies across the sky.”
325
  Military expert Eliot Cohen echoed this 
sentiment when he observed that “people will always want humans in the loop.”
326
  When asked 
about the potential for arming autonomous robots during an interview, Helen Greiner of military 
robot manufacturer iRobot reportedly replied that such a scenario was so far in the future that she 
did not “see it as an issue.”
327
  Robert Quinn, vice president of military robot manufacturer 
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Foster-Miller, refuted the notion of armed autonomous robots more forcefully when he stated that 
man remaining in the loop was a “line in the sand.”
328
    
 
However, not everyone agrees with such absolutes.  Military technology expert Noah Shachtman 
observed that such blanket statements more closely resembled brainwashing than analysis.
329
  
Additionally, Shachtman noted that people are generally uncomfortable with the fact that the 
military is outsourcing its core competencies to robots, and that the detractors’ adherence to 
outright dismissals of armed, autonomous robots “helps keep people calm that this isn’t the 
Terminators.”
330
    
 
The continuing appeals to science-fiction reveal an inherent skepticism that humanity can 
advantageously and appropriately harness military robots.  On the contrary, the rise of 
autonomous UAVs promises to introduce many key future tactical advantages.  Specifically, 
autonomous technology will allow the U.S. Air Force to better leverage UAVs for large-scale ISR 
and strike purposes, thus adopting and expanding the successful small-scale UAV model 
established by the CIA since 2001.  The next sections will explore the challenges that the U.S. Air 
Force is currently facing in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare conflicts, as well as strategic 
vision for employing future autonomous UAVs to meet this challenge.  The discussion will 
address the following points:  
                                                          
328
 Ibid., pg. 124 
329
 Ibid., pg. 124 
330






 The U.S. Air Force’s effectiveness in the War on Terror is being increasingly questioned 
because of the potential for lethal airpower to undermine public support abroad and 
because of the U.S. Air Force’s lack of a tactical reconnaissance aircraft.  
 Autonomous UAVs will provide a new set of tactical advantages outlined by the U.S Air 
Force within their 2047 timeframe that will provide tactical reconnaissance and discreet 
lethal strike capabilities desperately lacking in current arsenals.  
 In a time of defense spending cuts for the foreseeable future, autonomous UAVs will 
reduce the military’s financial burden by significantly reducing the number of personnel 
and resources associated with human piloted aircraft and non-autonomous UAV “logistic 
tails.” 
 
2.3.1 The United States Air Force’s Identity Crisis in Counterinsurgency 
Conflicts and Irregular Warfare 
For the past five or six decades, the U.S. Air Force has been equipping itself to fight a nuclear 
nation-state of equal skill and technological prowess.  This mindset is encapsulated in the U.S. 
Air Force’s capstone operations publication – titled Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations 
and Organization – which emphasizes high intensity kinetic operations.
331
  During the Cold War, 
the U.S. Air Force has been designing its weaponry and strategic doctrines to counter the Soviet 
Union.  Recently, the emergence of China as a potential adversary has likely compelled the U.S. 
Air Force to continue investing in extremely expensive, state-of-the-art warplanes, such as the 
Lockheed Martin’s $143 million F-22 Raptor.
332
  Indeed, Lockheed Martin’s F-22 webpage touts 
the Raptor’s advanced stealth, maneuverability, and air dominance.
333
   
 
However, there is one problem: this bank-breaking warplane is virtually useless in the 10-year 
War on Terror, in part because the enemy forces do not have warplanes and tend to avoid 
conventional battles.  In 2007, tensions mounted within the military ranks when then-Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates expressed his belief that future conflicts would represent small, asymmetric 
wars that would not feature the Air Force’s capabilities.
334
  Additionally, Gates singled out the F-
22 Raptor as an expensive Air Force system that had almost no role in the War on Terror.
335
  
Gates further reprimanded a top U.S. Air Force official for “borderline insubordination” after the 
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general informed him that he planned to purchase twice as many F-22s as had been authorized, 
directly violating Gates’ orders.
336
   
 
This showdown mirrors the 1949 “Revolt of the Admirals” incident when three U.S. Navy 
admirals were fired over a disagreement regarding resource appropriation between the 
construction of a new class of supercarriers (the USS United States) and long-range nuclear 
bombers.
337
  At that time, resource allocation for supercarriers exemplified “business as usual” for 
the military and represented another instance in which military planners sought to adopt current 
equipment and practices for the new (nuclear) age.  As retired U.S. Air Force Colonel John 
Jogerst succinctly asks, “[is] the F-22 our United States, or will we shift our priorities to build 
needed capabilities for [irregular warfare]?”
338
      
 
The U.S. Air Force’s desire to defy orders and purchase hugely expensive hardware that only has 
limited utility in today’s conflicts is representative of a larger U.S. Air Force institutional identity 
crisis, causing many defense analysts to openly question the need for technologically advanced 
warplanes altogether.
339
  This skepticism likely stems from the fact that military operations have 
recently been expanded to encompass many additional missions beyond the kinetic operations 
outlined in the Air Force Doctrine Document 2, to include “humanitarian assistance, disaster 
relief, counterinsurgency (COIN), unconventional warfare (UW), and theater-security 
cooperation with partner nations.”
340
  In other words, the U.S. Air Force is attempting to misapply 















its doctrine of kinetic, conventional strikes to UW and COIN settings, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
 
Consequently, the U.S. Air Force needs to update its written doctrine and practices to reflect 
detailed, flexible plans outlining its strategic considerations for an eclectic array of future 
conflicts.  Given China’s rising military power, Russia’s strategic modernization, North Korea’s 
currently uncertain political future, and Iran’s increasingly adversarial posturing, such doctrine 
cannot abandon conventional and nuclear warfare planning.  However, despite its inability to 
predict the need for a robust COIN strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Air Force planners still 
believe that such situations will not occur again.
341
  The U.S. Air Force has neglected political 
and budgetary issues associated with long-term involvement in unconventional conflicts.
342
  
Additionally, the U.S. Air Force has given little thought to a viable exit strategy regarding the 
training and equipping of a destabilized country’s military.
343
  In a 2011 piece published in the 
Air and Space Power Journal, Thomas Rath summarizes this situation when he notes that the 
“[U.S. Air Force] has so distanced itself from the realities and demands of [irregular warfare] that 
it has no awareness – much less understanding – of the critical role that airpower must play….”
344
  
Retired U.S. Air Force Colonel John Jogerst further clarified the U.S. Air Force’s position when 
he observed that it had dismissed UW as the “last war” and was calling for an “all-out push for 
modernization to prepare for war with a technologically sophisticated peer or near-peer -
enemy.”
345
   
 
                                                          
341
 Jogerst, op. cit. 
342











Recent historical evidence underscores a persuasive and urgent need for the U.S. Air Force to 
formally determine how to best support unconventional conflicts.  To wit, none of the 14 major 
global conflicts during the summer of 2008 were conventional in nature.
346
  Only 4 of the roughly 
30 major conflicts from 2000-2009 were fought between nations.
347
  A 2007 RAND report 
identified eight regions that are not controlled by a recognizable government, thus potentially 
representing ideal terrorist safe havens.
348
  Recently, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Colombia, the 
Philippines, and notably Venezuela and Nigeria – two of the largest U.S. oil suppliers – have 
experienced unconventional conflicts.
349
  Combined with the plethora of potential future global 
destabilizations, the U.S.’s decade of UW conflicts within Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and 
arguably Libya highlight the fact that the U.S. has been heavily involved in UW and COIN 
operations in recent years and will likely continue to be involved for the foreseeable future.        
 
To successfully participate in UW and COIN operations, the U.S. Air Force must identify its set 
of core competencies that uniquely address the special objectives of these conflicts.  Regarding 
important COIN campaign features, retired Royal Air Force pilot Paul Smyth notes that “there is 
broad acceptance of principles such as the primacy of politics in a COIN campaign and the need 
for a political aim, the imperative for a coordinated pan-government approach, the importance of 
intelligence and information, the effective separation of insurgents from their base of support, the 
neutralization of the insurgent, the need for long-term postinsurgency considerations, and the 
need to protect the population.”
350
  In other words, COIN campaigns differ from conventional 
conflicts in that COIN campaigns feature a legitimacy-seeking clash of ideals that is fought for 
the hearts and minds of innocent civilians.  Consequently, the ultimate goal is inherently political, 
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as physical security is but one of many possible issues that are important to a given population.  
For example, the withdrawal of visible U.S. military presence could be the population’s desired 
goal.   
 
For terrorist groups like al Qaeda, having public support is extremely important for several 
reasons.  Because the terrorists cannot defeat the U.S. military in a conventional fight, the secrecy 
of terrorist movements and activities is paramount to their success.
351
  Obtaining such secrecy 
necessitates blending in with the civilian population.  This secrecy is continuously preserved to 
the extent that the public sympathizes with the terrorists’ ideology and chooses not to reveal the 
terrorists’ identities or locations to the U.S. military.  Al Qaeda learned this lesson all too well 
when it alienated local Iraqi citizens by carrying out a series of brutal decapitations.
352
  Thus, to 
obtain and maintain widespread support, recruits, and resources, terrorists must continue to 
ensure that their message is receiving media attention by regularly engaging in psychological 
deception and shocking acts of violence that are carefully tailored to avoid hurting the terrorists’ 
perceived constituency among the local population.
353
  As an example of deception, al Qaeda has 
sought to draw parallels between the U.S.’s involvement in Afghanistan with the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan, thus highlighting a scenario in which the U.S. could collapse under the 
economic burden of maintaining a costly war within the country in the same way that the Soviet 
Union collapsed shortly after leaving Afghanistan.
354
  Rightly or wrongly, such a parallel would 
be useful for al Qaeda because it creates the perception for its followers that the group is capable 
of defeating world superpowers.  Additionally, al Qaeda attempted to use the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq to rally support by using its publications to argue that the U.S. was aggressively attacking 
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Muslims, and that al Qaeda was a protector of the faith.
355
  Thus, in a conflict where perceptions 
are reality, Dr. Mark Clodfelter – a professor of military strategy at the National War College – 
summarizes this strategy by observing that the skilled insurgent “will work hard to paint his cause 




Because the sympathies and allegiances of the local citizenry are of such great importance in 
determining the ultimate success of insurgencies and terrorist activities, the U.S. military must 
also ensure that its actions do not alienate the population, lest it increase support for the opposing 
forces.  This point is the reason that the U.S. Air Force’s powerful airstrikes have frequently 
backfired in spite of achieving the desired tactical goals of their use.  Although kinetic power 
serves a useful purpose in UW by destroying insurgents who pose a danger to the military and 
civilians, such strikes can anger the local population when innocent citizens are accidently killed.  
Such a scenario was outlined earlier in this work regarding how civilian casualties resulting from 
UAV strikes in Pakistan may have had the unintended consequence of rallying the local 
population against the U.S. and increasing recruiting and support for al Qaeda and the Taliban.  
Consequently, multi-year airstrike campaigns fueled by open-ended political goals “play directly 
into the insurgent’s hand and intensify the likelihood that he will wage a sporadic guerilla war 





Although any type of military operation may produce unintended civilian casualties, such 
accidents resulting from airstrikes preferentially receive the most media exposure, thus giving the 
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U.S. Air Force a smaller margin of error in COIN campaigns.
358
  In Afghanistan, civilian 
casualties from airstrikes have defined public, media, and political perceptions associated with 
their use despite the fact that only a small fraction of air sorties have ever produced any civilian 
casualties.
359
  Such accidents clearly damaged the overall COIN campaign in Afghanistan by 
undermining popular support for the U.S.-led alliance.
360
  Thus, it is entirely possible that these 
rare collateral damage incidents have actually increased the overall number of militants actively 
opposing U.S. forces in both Afghanistan and Pakistan by compelling some fraction of the 
militant’s passive supporters to take up arms against the United States.   
 
Despite these drawbacks, kinetic airpower remains a staple capability for the U.S. Air Force in 
any conflict, and military officers cannot be expected to eschew airpower if U.S. servicemen are 
attacked or if a high-value militant leader has been located.  In fact, heavily-controlled airpower 
serves a crucial role in the current Afghanistan conflict.
361
  The real challenge is determining how 
the U.S. Air Force can effectively incorporate airpower in COIN and UW conflicts without 
undermining the military’s strategic goals.  Ideally, achieving such goals begins by acquiring the 
capabilities needed to separate militants from the general population and/or apply lethal force to 
militants without producing collateral damage.  Given the fact that the public’s perceptions 
regarding U.S. airpower are just as important as the physical consequences of any airstrike, an 
important secondary requirement is that the lethal force’s visibility should be minimized to the 
greatest extent possible to avoid instilling negative perceptions in the local population regarding 
the U.S.’s intents and capabilities.  Most importantly, achieving these goals requires mobility and 
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robust ISR capabilities that allow enemy forces to be located, watched, and struck at a time and 
place that minimizes collateral damage.
362
   
 
Despite their recent utility in COIN and UW conflicts, current UAV usage fails to fully achieve 
these goals for several reasons.  Larger UAVs, such as the Predator, are ideal surveillance tools 
for observing a specific target for an extended period to determine the target’s pattern of life, 
which can be used to forecast the best moment to strike the target without endangering civilians.  
However, such success often overshadows the fact that UAVs have very little ability to perform 
reconnaissance because they frequently cannot be used to monitor situational awareness due to 
their reliance on high-magnification cameras which limits their field of view.
363
  Alternatively, 
smaller hand-held UAVs, such as the Raven, are ideal for very short range reconnaissance.
364
  In 
either case, technical limitations dictate that UAVs must first be directed to their targets by 
vulnerable, relatively immobile ground assets before they can perform their respective 
surveillance or reconnaissance missions.
365
   
 
Even if UAVs could locate enemy forces unaided by ground assets, they would have great 
difficulty surprising the enemy.  Many of today’s commonly-used UAVs have extremely noisy 
propellers because their designs do not optimize sound reduction practices.
366
  Thus, militants do 
not need special equipment to know when a UAV is approaching; they can quickly run for cover 
whenever they hear one approaching.  This limitation carries considerable importance because 
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sound is the primary signature sensed by people on the ground, thus rendering noisy ISR/light 
attack platforms ineffective.
367
     
 
Lastly, the recent incidents of insurgents hacking into UAV control feeds using cheap off-the-
shelf software illustrate another UAV vulnerability.  Although military officials have indicated 
that these feeds have now been encrypted to prevent insurgent interception, the very fact that 
insurgents can still detect the presence of feed signals using simple portable receivers provides 
them with valuable information regarding the proximity of searching UAVs.
368
  Thus, despite 
military-grade encryption, insurgents can still defeat these advanced technological systems by 
disappearing whenever feeds are detected for as long as UAVs continue to be remotely piloted 
from afar.
369
       
 
Despite the UAV’s many advantages, the combination of their shortcomings is significant for 
UW conflicts, in which the secrecy of militant movement is paramount for avoiding powerful 
U.S. conventional weapons.  History indicates that militant tactical units are generally sufficiently 
small to avoid detection until they muster to attack.
370
  To counter such guerilla tactics, the U.S. 
needs to invest in light reconnaissance assets that are suitable at both finding and surveying the 
enemy while being capable of carrying out small-scale, low-visibility precision strike capabilities.  
Such tactical reconnaissance assets should also be able to provide confirmation of strike result, 
flexible viewing ranges and angles, and high mobility.
371
  Being largely unable to locate enemy 
targets unassisted, watch enemy forces secretly, and strike targets discreetly, UAVs do not 
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currently fill this needed tactical reconnaissance role.  Illustrating this point is Boeing’s inability 
to effectively provide UAV surveillance along the U.S.-Mexico border despite the fact that it is 
already several years into a multi-year contract to provide such a service.  Such a scenario is 
significantly more tractable than searching for enemy combatants in a foreign land, as this 
program involves a combination of a clearly defined, well-mapped border and an uncontested 
area that is backed by a border fence and stationary video surveillance.
372
  




2.3.2 Key Technology Enablers Supporting Future Autonomous UAVs  
Continued investments in research and development supporting UAV autonomy and UAV 
miniaturization may ultimately allow UAVs to provide the missing tactical reconnaissance role 
sometime within the U.S. Air Force’s 2047 timeline for UAV automation.
373
  Regardless of 
whether the U.S. Air Force explicitly recognizes how autonomous UAVs can improve its 
standing in UW and COIN campaigns, recent Department of Defense and U.S. Air Force 
publications indicate that the U.S. military certainly understands the numerous advantages 
provided by future autonomous systems.  For example, the United States Air Force Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 and the FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap provide a comprehensive overview of the future tactical considerations surrounding 
UAV usage.
374, 375
  However, these documents do not provide a comprehensive overview 
regarding how these numerous tactical advantages interact with each other to produce an 
overarching strategic vision for the role of UAVs in COIN and UW settings; i.e., the “big 
picture.”   
 
Noel Sharkey, a professor of artificial intelligence and robotics at the University of Sheffield in 
England, recently observed that military robots are being deployed as quickly as they are made 
without any discussion regarding their development.
376
  The implication is that near-term goals 
are dominating UAV development to such a large extent that a unified long-term vision is 
ignored.   A second worrisome implication is that UAV use appears to be driven more by 
technology push rather than user pull.  Indeed, when Peter Singer of the Brookings Institute was 
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reportedly asked by a senior defense department strategy expert about who was developing the 
strategy for UAV development and usage, Singer answered “everyone else thinks it’s you.”
377
  
This section will describe areas in which UAV autonomy is currently needed, outline desired 
future UAV tactical advantages, provide examples highlighting current progress towards these 
tactical goals, and offer analysis regarding how these autonomous capabilities will best fit 
together to support COIN and UW operations.   
 
In many ways, future UAVs will represent a rapid departure from currently fielded UAV designs 
and capabilities.  Today’s UAVs feature medium-to-large high-altitude platforms that stalk 
targets previously identified by sources on the ground to cultivate a collection of intelligence that 
is sifted and processed over a period of time by analysts located in a distant place.  Eventually, a 
decision is made regarding whether the target should be struck or abandoned in favor of a new 
quarry.  Unfortunately, actionable intelligence becomes obsolete faster than ever in the 
information age.
378
   Previous conflicts, featuring conventional forces whose relatively slow 
mobility and posturing generally allowed ample time to thoroughly review all relevant 
intelligence before choosing a course of action, have given way to networks of militants whose 
members are difficult to distinguish from civilians and who move so frequently that knowledge of 
their locations yesterday provides little information of their whereabouts today.   
 
With so little time to act, the previously distinct tasks of intelligence gathering and intelligence 
analysis have become temporally compressed.  The increasing speed of modern warfare will 
compel the U.S. Air Force to adopt UAVs that are designed to proactively search and hunt enemy 









forces by locating and anticipating their movements.
379
  In adopting such a goal, the process of 
intelligence analysis will be pushed towards the tip of the spear, thus forcing intelligence analysts 
to become real-time participants in the hunt.
380
  As UAV autonomy becomes refined and 
perfected, such real-time intelligence analysis will need to be implemented directly into the 
UAV’s software, thus empowering the vehicle to rapidly make decisions on its own.   
 
To achieve this vision of discreet, autonomous “hunter” UAVs that can locate, observe, and strike 
targets without alienating the local populace, numerous technology enablers must first be 
achieved to complement the development of the artificial neural network architecture that serves 
as the substrate for the advanced artificial intelligence.  These enablers generally fall within three 
distinct groupings: 
1. Development of Wide-Area “Smart” Sensors 
2. Development of Micro UAVs 
3. Development of Networked, Cooperative UAVs 






2.3.2.1 Development of Wide-Area “Smart” Sensors 
So far, this work has examined the feasibility of achieving UAV autonomy within the next few 
decades by considering the general exponential growth trend of technology and highlighting 
examples of increasingly autonomous robots within the past decade.  Additionally, this work has 
described how biologically-inspired artificial neural networks are well-suited for appropriately 
sensing and acting in new and ambiguous environments in a manner that is influenced by a 
combination of dynamically-adjusted mathematical weights “learned” from previous experiences 
that are sensitive to outcome feedback.  Lastly, autonomy’s benefits for ISR missions were 
highlighted.   
 
The current section extends the discussion by exploring the need for autonomous UAVs to 
redress manpower shortages engendered by current UAV technology.  Additionally, this section 
explores how the development of wide-area “smart” sensors will help relieve this manpower 
strain in the short term by allowing UAVs to autonomously locate targets while enabling the 
long-term development of fully autonomous systems.  If artificial neural network development 
represents the creation of a UAV’s autonomous “brain,” then wide-area “smart” sensor 
development represents the creation of a UAV’s “sensory organs” that will help the autonomous 
brain make decisions through environmental monitoring and sampling.   
 
In today’s War on Terror, UAVs are arguably most heralded for their “costless” projection of 
military power without exposing friendly forces to danger.  As was mentioned earlier, individual 





is that the UAV’s cost – both in terms of manpower and price – is more complicated when the 
UAV’s logistical tail is fully assessed.   
 
First, the ability to remotely project military power via UAVs consequently creates a large need 
for subsequent intelligence analysis.  Ever since September 11
th
 2001, the amount of hours the 
U.S. Air Force spends conducting ISR missions has increased 3,100 percent, with most of these 
missions being conducted by drones.
381
  Throughout each of these missions, UAVs constantly 
maintain an active array of sophisticated sensors – including video, radar, and IR – that record 
and stream huge volumes of data back to ground bases.  Each day, the U.S. Air Force must 
process and analyze nearly 1,500 hours of full-motion video, in addition to 1,500 still images.
382
  
To put this in perspective, U.S. UAVs transmitted 24 years of video stream in 2009, and this 
volume was expected to increase by a factor of 30 during 2011.
383
       
 
Problematically, the requisite intelligence analysis functions needed to process this massive 
volume of data are still solely performed by (human) intelligence analysts, thus creating an 
information crisis.
384
  To keep up with daily incoming data, 19 analysts are generally required to 
analyze the data for each drone.
385
  During times of high operational tempo, a staggering 68 
analysts are required for each Predator UAV.
386
  Additionally, when including support staffs such 
as ground and recovery crews, a total of roughly 150 people is needed to execute each UAV 
operation.
387
  Consequently, the U.S. Air Force has 65,000 to 70,000 analysts to process the 
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aggregate UAV data, with at least one review indicating that 100,000 analysts are currently 
needed.
388
    
 
Contrary to popular perception, these numbers paint a clear picture: although UAVs remove 
humans from dangerous battlefields, they do not actually remove humans from war.  
Considerable manpower is still required to successfully execute meaningful campaigns that are 
physically undertaken by UAVs, and present trends indicate the situation will become much 
worse within the next few years.  The U.S. Air Force is slated to purchase three new advanced 
sensor pods during the 2011-2014 timeframe that will significantly increase the amount of 
information that a Reaper UAV can transmit.
389
  Billed as the “Gorgon Stare,” this advanced 
sensor pod will supplement the preexisting high-magnification video camera now carried by 
Predator and Reaper UAVs.
390
  Disagreement exists regarding exactly how many cameras are 
contained within the Gorgon Stare, with numbers ranging from 9 to 12.
391, 392
  What is agreed 
upon is that the Gorgon Stare sensor pod will carry at least five electro-optical cameras for 
daytime footage and four IR cameras for nighttime footage, each positioned at a different 
angle.
393
  These cameras are designed to provide a wide-area, low-resolution panoramic view of 
the landscape that the current high-magnification cameras do not provide, with images from 
individual cameras dynamically stitched together by a digital processer.
394
   The Gorgon Stare can 
reportedly capture an area with a 4km radius.
395
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The purpose of this wide-area view is to empower the UAV remote pilots to locate targets 
unassisted by ground assets at the target’s location.  Once a target is located, then the preexisting 
high-magnification camera can be used to acquire a detailed view.  This method conceptually 
mirrors a biological eye’s functionality in which highly distributed low-resolution peripheral 
receptors locate targets of interest, causing the eye’s high-resolution fovea region to be turned 
towards the target to acquire additional, focused visual information.    Additionally, U.S. Air 
Force officials hope that the Gorgon Stare will be useful in post-attack forensic analysis.
396
  For 
example, if an IED explodes, analysts could review the Gorgon Stare’s previously recorded 
panoramic video to reconstruct exactly how the IED was placed.   
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Gorgon Stare was beset with a number of technical shortcomings in 
its first round of testing that made it ineffective as a target locator.
397
  Although the U.S. Air 
Force has reportedly corrected some of the issues, it will not currently provide a date which the 
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Gorgon Stare will be operationally ready.
398
  Assuming that this new sensor eventually works as 
planned, its use will significantly increase the information overload currently created by single 
full-motion video streams that are currently overwhelming large teams of intelligence analysts.  
Indeed, one report provided a staggering estimate that nearly 2,000 analysts would be needed to 
fully process the video stream from a single Gorgon Stare unit.
399
  This figure does not account 
for the fact that significantly fewer UAVs would be required to watch a particular area, thus 
reducing combat air patrols and freeing up some analyst resources.  However, the resulting 
personnel savings would likely not counterbalance the huge number of analysts needed for 
Gorgon Stare.     
 
Despite the Gorgon Stare’s potential usefulness, its use would unfortunately exacerbate the 
current information crisis that UAVs are already creating for analysts, consequently creating a 
human capital crisis for the U.S. Air Force that is already short on manpower.  In addition to the 
projected analyst shortfall, the U.S. Air Force has not had enough trained remote pilots to execute 
all requested missions over the past few years.  At various times throughout the past decade, 
several competing strategies have been considered or adopted to mitigate this personnel shortfall. 
 
To meet the increasing number of UAV sortie requests, the U.S. Air Force has increased the 
number of remote pilots available to support UAV missions.  To meet long-term projected 
demands, the Air Force will need to expand its UAV pilot training program.  By 2009, the U.S. 
Air Force was training 200 two-man Predator and Reaper UAV crews, outnumbering pilots 
trained that year for all other U.S. fighter planes combined.  This trend has continued throughout 











  To achieve such impressive numbers, the U.S. Air Force has recently relaxed its 
requirement that UAV pilots be seasoned aviators from manned aircraft.
402
  Today, new UAV 
pilots are only required to spend a few tens of hours in a (manned) cockpit – roughly the 
equivalent of a private pilot’s license – to operate a UAV.
403
   
 
Unfortunately, the U.S Air Force UAV training program has not been able to keep up with the 
growing demand for UAV pilots.  In January 2008, the demand for UAV pilots was so serious 
that the Pentagon considered a proposal that would have suspended all Predator pilot training 
programs and immediately reassigned trainers and their aircraft to operational duty.
404
  Dubbed 
“all in,” the proposal was ultimately scaled back, in part because of some officers’ fears that the 
plan resembled similar steps that had been taken by the German Luftwaffe during World War II 





Ultimately, the U.S. Air Force decided to take three steps that could be immediately implemented 
to meet UAV crew shortages.  First, the tours of Predator crews were initially extended to retain 
trained pilots for longer periods.
406
  Second, former UAV pilots were recalled from their 
subsequent posts.
407
  Lastly, these Predator and Reaper crews were frozen in their positions 
indefinitely.
408
  For UAV pilots who had already been working 13 hours a day, sometimes 6 days 
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a week, the prospect of such grueling, open-ended service is likely psychologically challenging, a 
prospect which threatens the recruiting and retention of UAV pilots and future UAV programs. 
 
To supplement these strategies, the U.S. Air Force has been investing in force-multiplying 
technological solutions that would enhance a UAV pilot’s ability to control multiple UAVs 
simultaneously.
409
  During an interview with Peter Singer, one official stated that having “a 
dedicated operator for each robot will not pass the common sense test.”
410
  To achieve this goal, 
the new Multi-Aircraft Control system allows UAV pilots to control up to four aircraft at once.
411
    
 
However, research exists suggesting that such human multiplexing is problematic.  In flight tests 
featuring UAV pilots operating multiple UAVs, the pilots tended to fixate all attention on one 
UAV at the expense of the others.
412
  Additionally, a NATO study revealed that a UAV pilot’s 
operational performance was reduced by half when controlling two UAVs compared to only 
one.
413
  A report published on a remote operator’s ability to control multiple ground robots at a 
time found a similar result.
414
  According to Mark Draper, the technical adviser for supervisory-
control interfaces at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, a single UAV pilot could successfully 
manage up to a dozen UAVs if only fixed ground targets were under observation.
415
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Attempts are currently underway to improve UAV pilot performance while managing multiple 
aircraft.  For example, much effort is being exerted to design remote cockpits that reduce the 
elevated mental workload needed to multitask.  At Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, a new 
interface called the Vigilant Spirit Control Station was recently demonstrated, featuring a unique 
color-coded scheme that allows the pilot to quickly extract the most important flight and mission 
data.
416
  Research has also been devoted into a sensor net that can be placed on a UAV pilot’s 
head to monitor the brain’s electrical activity during flight.
417
  Such a device could be used in 
conjunction with heart rate and eye-movement monitoring to determine the pilot’s attentive and 
emotional states.
418
  If the pilot loses focus, attention could be restored by providing electrical 
stimulation to the brain’s frontal lobe.
419
  Alternatively, UAV control could be transferred to 
another pilot.  To fight the perpetual boredom associated with most UAV flights, drugs could be 




Alternatively, research is being conducted to develop artificial intelligence that will handle the 
routine tasks associated with piloting UAVs.  Mark Draper of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
suggested that UAV pilots could manage multiple UAVs if the machines could quickly transfer 
control to a human operator after autonomously recognizing a meaningful “anomaly” in the 
monitored environment.
421
   If the job of piloting UAVs is so tedious and boring that 
pharmaceuticals and neural stimulation are ultimately needed to perform well, increasing degrees 
of UAV autonomy seem quite appealing as an alternate solution.  Supporting the case for 
autonomy, U.S. Air Force engineer Bob Smith noted that “we thought the hard part would be 
making a vehicle do something on its own.  The hard part is making it do that thing well with a 
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  UAV autonomy would not eliminate the human’s role as a machine 
performance monitor, a role more suitable given that a multitasking pilot has already been shown 
to be unable to effectively control multiple UAVs.   
 
To create autonomous UAVs, the Pentagon is currently investing in “smart” sensors that can 
monitor the environment and alert humans when a significant anomaly has been detected.
423
  
Currently, the most fascinating and promising “intelligent” sensor is BAE System’s Autonomous 
Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance-Imaging System (ARGUS-IS) drone-mounted 
camera, which has been under development since 2007.
424
  The camera has a 1.8 gigapixel 
resolution and is comprised of four arrays containing 92 five-megapixel imagers, which are the 




  Similar to the Gorgon Stare, an onboard digital 
processor dynamically combines the images into a panoramic mosaic of the surrounding 
landscape.
427
  When mounted on a Hummingbird helicopter UAV that can loiter over 15,000ft for 
20 hours at a time, the ARGUS-IS can image 15 square-miles.
428
  BAE Systems indicates that the 
sensor will ultimately be capable of imaging over 100 square-miles at a time, and will have a 
ground sampling distance of 15 centimeters.
429
  In other words, each pixel will represent 6 inches 
of actual terrain.  Such a system will be dynamically capturing so much data that not all of it can 




  Thus, a maximum of 65 cameras can be 






 “BAE SYSTEMS AWARDED $18 MILLION DARPA CONTRACT TO LEAD IMAGING SYSTEM 
PROGRAM,” (See http://www.baesystems.co.uk/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_107105142443.html) 
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independently monitored and zoomed in or out at any given moment.
432
  The resolution is so good 
that individuals can be tracked.
433
   
 
Figure 19: ARGUS-IS’ Imaging Radius: This image conceptualizes how the ARGUS-IS captures a panoramic image. 
Source: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/02/gigapixel-flyin/ 
 
The most fascinating aspect of the ARGUS-IS is the artificial intelligence that is being 
implemented into the sensor’s digital processor.  Each of the individually streamed videos can 
automatically track interesting objects, such as a moving vehicle.
434
  Additionally, the sensors can 
automatically detect and label any object that moves anywhere within the monitored 
landscape.
435, 436
  To locate objects, each individual camera intelligently cooperates with the other 
cameras to determine where to search for motion.  If one camera recognizes that its assigned area 
is unlikely to contain any interesting motion, the camera automatically reassigns itself to help 
another camera that has located a more complicated visual area or an area in which high-interest 
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  Tests of this Particle Swarm Optimization technique 
allowed an object of interest to be found 70 times faster than standard linear-scanning 
techniques.
439
  Because such an advanced search routine allows tremendous resolution of 
interesting objects by devoting processing resources away from areas that are ultimately 




Thus, ARGUS-IS is a revolutionary smart-sensor that represents a combination of the Predator 
UAV’s high-magnification camera and the Gorgon Stare’s small-resolution wide-area cameras 
integrated into one dynamic acuity sensor.  Not only does the ARGUS-IS locate its own moving 
targets unassisted by ground assets, but it can autonomously harness its vast magnification 
potential to provide a detailed picture of the target while tracking it.  Such a design represents a 
striking improvement upon and departure from the human eyeball, as all visual resources can be 
devoted to the search process before creating a dynamic fovea within the visual field to better 
identify interesting targets as they are acquired.  After an interesting target has been acquired for 
tracking, the camera’s frame rate can be dynamically increased to such a great extent that 
individual bullets can be autonomously monitored as they fly through the air, thus allowing the 
sensor to trace the shot back to the shooter.
441
   
 
When such sensors are operationally deployed, their tactical impact should be significant.  
Although likely best-suited for rural and wilderness environments not featuring many moving 
human targets, UAVs equipped with the Gorgon Stare or the Argus-IS will finally be capable of 
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fulfilling the tactical reconnaissance role so desperately needed by the U.S. Air Force in the War 
on Terror.  Future fully autonomous UAVs equipped with these sensors will not be restricted by 
the limited bandwidth that prevents constant transmission of all ARGUS-IS sensor data to a 
remote pilot because the UAV will be able to both process and act on all of the data at the local 
level, while occasionally sending small amounts of highly processed data to other users as 
needed.  Such local processing also decreases at least two of the technical vulnerabilities outlined 
earlier in this paper; fewer transmissions significantly decrease the opportunities which enemy 
combatants can detect the presence of UAVs by monitoring the airwaves for video feeds and 
reduce the likelihood that the actual video feeds could be intercepted and monitored with cheap 
software, such as SkyGrabber.  Additionally, the lack of continuous involvement from pilots and 
analysts would allow such tactical reconnaissance assets to be used around the clock without 
placing strain on military personnel.   
 
In addition to tactical advantages, fully autonomous UAVs provide economic incentives 
compared to their remotely piloted counterparts by reducing reliance on the U.S. Air Force’s most 
costly asset – its personnel.
442
  For instance, an estimated $135,000 could be saved per pilot by 
down-sizing UAV pilot training programs.
443
  Additionally, cost savings will occur due to 
reducing the number of salaried UAV pilots and analysts.  Excluding development costs, the 
Global Hawk UAV’s support costs are $88 million more expensive than the actual UAV, 
meaning that considerable cost savings can be achieved by removing expensive human elements 
from the equation.
444
  Each in-theater solider that could be removed from the battlefield through 
the use of autonomous UAVs would yield large personnel savings, as each soldier stationed in 
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Afghanistan costs the military $850,000-$1.4 million per year.
445
  The use of autonomous UAVs 
as low-orbit pseudo satellites combined with a significantly decreased need for real-time 
transmission capabilities could potentially reduce the need to launch new satellites, potentially 
saving billions of dollars.
446
  Lastly, decreased transmission requirements would reduce the 
bandwidth of commercial satellite access that must be purchased each year to facilitate UAV 
operations.
447
  At the commercial rate of $40,000 per MHz per year, automating a fleet of 50 
Predator and Reaper UAVs could save up to $25 million per year.
448
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2.3.2.2 Development of Networked, Cooperative Micro UAVs 
Although advanced sensor technology for larger UAVs, such as the ARGUS-IS, will allow these 
aircraft to locate potentially interesting exterior targets, such as militants or weapons, even a 
camera resolution of six inches is unlikely to accurately capture a person’s unique facial features, 
specific behaviors, and equipment.  Additionally, UAVs equipped with such sensors would be 
unable to visually monitor suspected militants located in interior settings, thus limiting their 
usefulness in urban environments.  Indeed, even if such aircraft could accurately identify 
militants, their destructive Hellfire missile payloads would likely produce much collateral damage 
if used in cities, thus rendering current UAV lethal strike capabilities unsuitable.  The capability 
to locate and strike targets within urban environments is becoming increasingly important has 
UAV strikes in Pakistan’s remote countryside drive al Qaeda leadership into cities for 
protection.
449
   
 
To address these deficiencies, smaller “micro” UAVs will be needed to complement larger UAVs 
equipped with wide-area sensors.  Development of such UAVs is ongoing, with many successful 
breakthroughs occurring over the last two decades.  Early technological limitations were 
overcome with the development of miniaturized micro electromechanical systems, such as 
gyroscopes, accelerometers, airspeed sensors, compact GPS receivers, and lithium ion-powered 
batteries.
450
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Such advances allowed the creation of the small Raven UAV, which could be hand-launched.  
Having less weight, more capable autopilot capabilities, and three-times the operational 
endurance of its predecessor, the Raven represented a significant achievement for providing very 
limited tactical reconnaissance capabilities directly to soldiers on the battlefield.
451
  However, 
since it is launched by soldiers on the battlefield and has a relatively short range, the Raven’s use 
is strictly limited to areas in which the U.S. military already has manpower, thus making it 
unsuitable for use in areas in which access is denied to U.S. soldiers.  Additionally, the Raven is 
too large and flies too high to provide detailed urban and indoor intelligence. 
 
Similar to artificial intelligence development and aspects of advanced sensor development, 
research efforts for creating the next generation of micro UAVs are turning to biology for 
inspiration.  Specifically, researchers are in the process of creating micro UAVs that resemble 
birds and insects, both in appearance and flight mechanics.
452
  The goal of such a design is to 
produce UAVs that blend in with the natural environment and penetrate air defense systems, thus 
attracting little attention while they collect detailed intelligence.
453, 454
  Although the ability to 
remain discreet has tactical benefits by preventing militants from knowing that they are being 
observed, it provides the secondary benefit of reducing the local population’s exposure to these 
surveillance tactics.  Thus, the general population’s support will not be eroded through the use of 
micro UAVs, especially when these UAVs are deployed in urban areas.  Gathering intelligence 
without alienating local populations will allow the U.S. Air Force to become more relevant in 
COIN and UW campaigns. 
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The physical designs for these biologically-inspired micro UAVs are currently in development, 
and the initial technology demonstrations occurred in 2008.
455
  A hummingbird UAV was 
demonstrated by AeroVironment – the maker of the Raven – in 2011 and was funded by DARPA, 
thus clearly indicating the military’s interest in micro UAVs.
456
  The hummingbird can reportedly 
fly 11 miles per hour and perch on windowsills, allowing it to gather limited intelligence inside 
buildings.
457
  To create these artificial birds, flapping wing technology is being pioneered to 
recreate the physics of natural flight for both bird and insect UAVs.
458
  Working wings allow 
these micro UAVs to hover in place while surveying a target, thus allowing the drone to operate 
in small spaces.  Additionally, prototype claws and feet have been developed to allow these micro 
UAVs to stably land on a variety of objects, such as tree branches or power lines.
459
  Because the 
dynamic coordination and control of artificial muscles involved in seamless high-speed landing is 
a complex process, autonomous landing capabilities will be required to control the micro UAV’s 
muscles.
460
  By 2015, the U.S. Air Force anticipates fielding semi-autonomous bird-like micro 
UAVs for a week at a time to detect harmful chemicals and explosives.
461
    
 
Due to their less complex muscles, insect micro UAVs feature wing motion technology that is 
even simpler to design than artificial bird wings.
462
  Current research efforts are focused on moth 
and fly micro UAVs that are equipped with sensors that can detect enemy personnel and nuclear 
weapons.
463
  Ultimately, the Pentagon intends to field insect micro UAVs that weigh less than 10 
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grams and with wingspans smaller than 2 inches.
464
  Artificial insects could more easily and 
discreetly penetrate indoor environments than bird micro UAVs.  
 
Within the next two decades, the military envisions that micro UAVs will possess advanced 
technologies that support discreet ISR missions.  For example, micro UAVs will become 
increasingly autonomous by engaging in intelligence collection capabilities without receiving 
inputs from a remote human operator.
465
  These micro UAVs will plan their behaviors in a 
manner that balances the need to remain covert with mission priorities, such as selecting the flight 
path to a target that best maximizes the drone’s concealment.
466
  The use of quiet electric motors 
will further decrease the probability that these drones will be detected.
467
  Ideally, micro UAVs 
will achieve long operational endurance times by converting local biomass into energy and by 
recharging their electrical power supply by exploiting local infrastructures.
468
   
 
In addition to ISR capabilities, micro UAVs are well-suited for performing precision targeted, 
lethal strikes.  The U.S. Air Force undertook a 2008 research project – appropriately dubbed 
Project Anubis – to create a micro UAV with lethal strike capabilities.
469
  At slightly over half a 
million dollars, the original plan called for micro UAVs equipped with sensors, data links, and a 
munitions payload “to engage time-sensitive fleeting targets in complex environments.”
470
  The 
FY 2010 DoD Budget briefly notes that Project Anubis was successfully completed, with a total 
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of $1.75 million being devoted to the project.
471
  Such micro UAVs could deliver a precision 
strike with a poison needle, significantly reducing the likelihood that collateral damage would 
occur.   
 
Considering that missile ordnance for larger UAV aircraft will soon weigh less than 5lbs and will 
be capable of autonomously tracking targets with an electro-optical seeker, it’s not inconceivable 
that such lethal micro UAVs could actually double as ordinance for larger UAVs.
472
   In theory, 
micro UAVs would be dispatched to a location designated by a larger UAV equipped with a 
wide-area sensor or by dismounted soldiers to collect additional data discreetly.  Swarms of micro 
UAVs could potentially canvass a large area in tandem to search for potential militants and 
weapons, thus increasing the overall search efficiency in a manner similar to the Particle Swarm 
Optimization technique used by the ARGUS-IS’s individual cameras to quickly extract mission 
essential information from a large amount of data.  The technology supporting this cooperative 
search strategy has already been demonstrated in field experiments featuring 6 robots 
autonomously coordinating with each other.
473
  Additionally, algorithms designed for 
autonomous multi-vehicle control have been demonstrated to effectively guide the coordination 
of 200 vehicles during simulation testing.
474
  The development of interoperable software will 
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To increase the effectiveness of autonomously cooperating robots searching a target location, 
sensor capabilities will become increasingly fractionated, thus enabling the physical diffusion of 
various capabilities among a decentralized network of multiple micro UAVs.
476
  Through the 
widespread use of autonomous cooperative algorithms and data sharing, individual micro UAVs 
would not be required to possess all the capabilities needed to execute a mission, thus allowing 
micro UAVs to become highly specialized to perform certain tasks.
477
  For example, different 
micro UAVs would be capable of performing lethal strikes, electro-optical imaging, electronic 
warfare, communication relay, and other advanced sensors, thus allowing these capabilities to be 
fielded at a relatively low cost through fractionated systems.
478
  The exact combination of micro 




Using this autonomous distributed network, all data acquired by micro UAVs within the network 
would be shared with all other micro UAVs within the target area, thus extending the effective 
range of all UAVs throughout the network.  This network “intelligence” will increase the 
survivability of capabilities due to redundant capability-elements spread throughout an 
autonomous network that can reconfigure the position of physical assets to compensate for any 
individual micro UAV losses.
480
  Short-range communication technologies, such as burst mode 
transmission, radio frequency agility, and laser links will significantly decrease the probability 
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 Clapper et al, op. cit.  (FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Road Map) 
 
2.4 Discussion 
Based on the major themes just explored – the foundational architecture and utility of UAV 
autonomy, advanced sensor development, and networked micro UAV usage – conclusions can be 
derived regarding the future interaction of these themes in increasing the U.S. Air Force’s ability 
to strike militant targets while decreasing collateral damage to civilians and infrastructure, thus 
allowing the U.S. Air Force to become more effective in UW and COIN contingencies.  The 
following diagram provides an overview of the elements and interactions that will govern the 
evolution of autonomous UAVs: 
 
Figure 20: Overview of Autonomous UAV Strategic Vision 
 
The single most important technological advancement for future UAV usage is the development 
of advanced autonomous capabilities (featured on the left-hand side of the diagram) because 
these capabilities will be useful for all additional UAV models and supporting technologies, from 
intelligent sensors to intelligent munitions.  Artificial intelligence research supporting UAV 





cognitive processing capabilities, with these capabilities likely occurring faster than expected due 
to technology’s exponential growth. 
 
Overall, automating UAVs for ISR and lethal strike functions will help manage the information 
overload crisis associated with UAV sensor data volume, reduce the demand for critical 
bandwidth because of significantly reduced wireless transmission loads, reduce the military’s 
manpower strain in jobs supporting UAV missions, allow the U.S. Air Force to gather data 
around-the-clock, field more UAVs at once, and significantly decrease UAV vulnerability to 
electronic attack.   
 
Two different categories of UAVs will use these advanced autonomous capabilities, with the first 
being the larger Reaper UAVs.  Equipped with wide-area scanners like the 1.8 gigapixal ARGUS-
IS, these Reaper UAVs can someday locate and track individuals anywhere within a 100-mile 
area with minimal help from ground sources, thus providing tactical reconnaissance capabilities 
to the U.S. Air Force (“Top Level Situational Awareness”).  Their ability to detect radar (Radar 
Detection) will provide increased survivability in anti-access regions. 
 
The second category of UAVs that will use advanced autonomous capabilities is micro UAVs.  
Equipped with miniaturized, fractionated sensors and disguised as small organisms, networks of 
micro UAVs can penetrate anti-access regions and blend into the environment.  They can then 
work in tandem to quickly gather additional data in a discreet manner that supplements data 
acquired from larger UAVs many thousands of feet above the target (Detailed Bottom-Level 





gather intelligence that is often lost when targets are destroyed by missiles fired by large UAVs 
from far above.  These micro UAVs will be able to perform facial and voice analysis to identify 
known militant targets and could recognize specific weapons and behavioral patterns indicating 
potential terrorist involvement.  When militants have been confidently identified, micro UAVs 
could strike using miniature ordinance, small arms, or other asymmetric means.   Additionally, 
micro UAVs could detect chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive material and 
subsequently neutralize the stockpiles. 
 
As Reaper UAVs and micro UAVs are increasingly fielded in operational settings, the number of 
kinetic strikes against militant targets will also increase due to the increase in opportunities 
provided by additional targeting data.  While this reality will increase the number of militants 
killed (Enemy Combatants Neutralized), an increase in kinetic strikes will also increase the total 
number accidental civilian deaths (Collateral Damage).  However, as top and bottom level 
situational awareness is improved, the number of militants killed per strike will increase and 
collateral damage will be better avoided.  This effect will be additionally magnified to the extent 
that all autonomous UAV sensor data can be shared with all other UAVs in the network, thus 
empowering individual UAVs with a greater basis for making decisions and choosing targets 
(Integrated Global Awareness).   
 
Autonomous UAVs will allow the U.S. Air Force to productively participate in UW and COIN 
campaigns by serving as discreet tactical reconnaissance hunters that can quickly locate militant 
targets and execute necessary surveillance and strike actions in all environments and in a manner 





importantly, autonomous UAVs will perform these functions while reducing U.S. personnel 
exposure to dangerous settings.  
 
Additionally, policymakers must realize that UAV usage also creates many societal challenges 
that must be addressed in tandem with increasing UAV usage and development.  The relationship 
of future UAVs to the challenges illuminated earlier is summarized in the diagram below: 
 
Figure 21: Overview of Autonomous UAV Advantages and Challenges 
 
Policymakers must be acutely aware of the possibility that UAV usage may be perceived as being 
so attractive that military action will be more quickly pursued than in the past to settle 
international disputes.  In instances clearly resembling “just wars,” the easier use of military 
power may prove advantageous for the greater good.  Otherwise, to prevent unnecessary 
bloodshed, policymakers should consider potential options for increasing the public’s “stake” in 
military campaigns to counter any general public disinterest in warfare that results from heavy 






The international community should also monitor and discuss the ethical issues associated with 
UAV usage to determine agreed-upon limitations as it has with other weapons, such as 
landmines.  The earlier these guidelines can be the determined, the more easily they can be 
implemented into the UAV development process while it is still in relative infancy.  Additionally, 
legal accountability should be clearly established for instances in which autonomous UAVs make 
mistakes. 
 
Lastly, policymakers and military planners alike must be prepared for the possibility that UAVs 
could be technologically vulnerable.  For example, malware, back doors, and viruses could be 
introduced to UAV hardware from anywhere in the world and at any time, thus compromising 
their ability to execute their missions.  If exploited, such vulnerabilities could immediately render 
the entire UAV fleet useless, if not an outright liability.  Additionally, technological 
overconfidence may compel policymakers to mistakenly believe that the technology is 
sufficiently advanced to handle missions before it is actually ready.  In both cases, the U.S. would 
suddenly find itself in a war that it is ill-equipped to fight.  To reduce the risk associated with 
both possibilities, much effort should be invested in developing verification programs that 
reliably and robustly demonstrate UAV technological capabilities when exposed to an array of 
scenarios.  
 
Although it is currently unclear how the overarching dynamics among the various UAV 
advantages and challenges will play out over the next few decades, artificial intelligence design, 
UAV development, and UAV employment are rapidly increasing and are here to stay.  Unlike the 
arrival of many previous technologies that revolutionized warfare, autonomous UAVs will 





further eroding humanity’s historical role in warfare.  Consequently, their use will provide the 
U.S. with a much-needed asset for countering violent insurgencies and frustrating militant 
attempts to break the U.S.’s will to fight by killing U.S. soldiers.  Given the continuing 
prevalence of irregular warfare and having been at war with al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan for over a decade, the advantages of developing autonomous UAVs are clear.   
 
Although the development of autonomous UAVs seems plausible within the next few decades 
and will likely provide the U.S. with numerous tactical military advantages, some may argue that 
the real question is whether the U.S. should empower autonomous robots to perform lethal 
strikes.  Such a concern is motivated by questions about whether a robot would truly appreciate 
the ethical nuances needed to appropriately weigh life-and-death decisions that are intricately 
connected to war, with the fear being that these autonomous UAVs would too frequently perform 
lethal strikes, thus causing unnecessary collateral damage.  Although it is too early in the 
development process to define the extent to which autonomous UAVs could mimic ethical 
reasoning, autonomous lethal strike capabilities could be considered acceptable if they do not 
produce more collateral damage than alternative manned-aircraft strikes used to achieve the same 
effect.  Such a comparison recasts the ethical question into an empirical one, which can be 
definitively answered as UAV development progresses.   
 
Tactical advantages aside, another equally compelling reason for pursuing autonomous lethal 
technologies is the fact that at least 40 countries are currently developing their own UAV 
programs.  As Peter Singer of the Brookings Institute has pointed out, continued international 
investment in UAV technology is here to stay, whether the U.S. chooses to abandon it over 





technology, then the U.S. can greatly influence the technology’s progression and maturity by 
ensuring that its UAVs operate in a manner that respects human rights and humanitarian 
concerns.  Otherwise, the U.S. would allow other countries to dictate the degree to which ethical 
concerns are incorporated into UAV design.  Given the human rights record of some of the 
countries with UAV programs, such as Iran and China, such ethical considerations are likely to be 
ignored.  Indeed, any U.S. abandonment of UAV research would additionally increase foreign 
UAV appeal by virtue of the fact that such technology would immediately give other countries an 
asymmetric tactical advantage over the U.S., further eroding any international interest in fielding 
ethical weapons.   
 
To the quintessential heroic figure of General George Patton, the thought of robotic vehicles 
engaging in offensive operations would likely be an affront to all that was pure and honorable 
about warfare.  Indeed, he once proclaimed that “many, who should know better, think that wars 
can be decided by soulless machines, rather than by the blood and anguish of brave men.”
483
  For 
better or worse, the arrival of autonomous UAVs will herald the beginning of the post-heroic age 
he disavowed.  It may be that proper design and application of UAV technology will reduce the 
blood and anguish by limiting or even preventing future conflicts.  By carefully examining the 
UAV’s future capabilities with a keen eye to the specific, projected needs that they will fulfill, it 
is hoped that the present research will contribute to forging the strategic vision necessary to guide 
UAV autonomy design decisions and policy choices to ensure that the U.S. has the right tools 
needed to succeed in the new age of 21
st
 century conflicts. 
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